Proposal “decision-vote-improve-proposal-system-dc“ (Active)Back

Title:Decision Vote: Improve Proposal System [DCG-Plan]
One-time payment: 5 DASH (470 USD)
Completed payments: no payments occurred yet (1 month remaining)
Payment start/end: 2020-11-13 / 2020-12-12 (added on 2020-11-02)
Final voting deadline: in passed
Votes: 640 Yes / 454 No / 23 Abstain
Will be funded: No. This proposal needs additional 284 Yes votes to become funded.
External information:
Manually vote on this proposal (DashCore - Tools - Debugconsole):
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Proposal description

1. Introduction

This is a decision proposal to increase the proposal system’s spending limit (i.e., its flexibility) and incentivize increasing the value of funded proposals (i.e., its efficiency). Similar to the visual identity / rebranding proposal from 2018, two proposals are being submitted for evaluation. These two proposals are mutually exclusive; only one may be implemented. Further detail about the voting process is found in the next section.

In preparing for this proposal, two alternatives emerged with enough interest and support for network-wide consideration. One option originated from Dash Core Group (DCG), the other from a group of masternode owner/operators (MNOs). The Dash trust protectors (TPs) are submitting both proposal options as a neutral third party. Apart from the proposal submission itself, individual TPs may choose to express their personal opinions non-neutrally.

The primary objective of both proposal system upgrade options is to provide the network with greater flexibility over proposal spending, while better aligning MNO incentives to avoid spending network resources on low-value proposals. The options differ in their approach and the resulting implications. The differences will be detailed in subsequent sections.

After this introduction, and the proposal process section that follows, further details about the background will be presented. These three sections, as well as the appendix at the end are identical in each of the two proposals, so you will only need to read these sections once. The only section that differentiates the two proposals is section 4.

Cross-reference links for each proposal:
[DCG Plan] -
[MNO Plan] -

Link to Dash Forum proposal discussion thread -

2. Process

The voting and proposal process consists of two phases:
  • Phase 1 - the two proposal options are evaluated against each other
  • Phase 2 - the favored option from Phase 1 is evaluated against our current system
In Phase 1 (this phase, this month) you are asked to vote for which option you prefer. Regardless of degree, the option with the most net (yes minus no) votes will proceed to the next phase (next month). DCG will implement the Phase 2 upgrade option if it exceeds the normal 10% net vote criterion in Phase 2. In the unlikely event the higher ranked proposal exceeds the 10% net yes votes during Phase 1, Phase 2 would not be necessary.

Edit for clarity: "net vote" means "yes" votes minus "no" votes.

In an effort to reduce the need to post and respond to comments and discussions in both proposals, we have created a Dash Forum thread we hope the community will leverage, particularly for any debate and comparisons. If you have comments or questions specifically related to one proposal, those could be posted on the Dash Central / Dash Nexus proposal itself. This will help reduce the workload for the proposal owners (POs) and others that would otherwise need to reply to the same comments in multiple locations.

3. Background

Dash Core Group identified several issues with network economics and incentives, and presented its initial findings in December 2019 at DCG’s Open House, available to view as a presentation titled “Improving Dash as a Store of Value”.

The presentation explored a number of unique attributes of the Dash network’s incentives and economics, and presented a hypothesis regarding the impact those attributes have had on Dash’s market performance and long-term price volatility.

These issues were addressed partially through an independent, but related proposal (passed in the July voting cycle), which approved a reallocation of the block subsidy. The changes were incorporated into v0.16 of Dash Core, which was released to mainnet on September 30, 2020. That proposal did not address any changes to the proposal system itself. Proposal system upgrades are the subject of this proposal.

Dash’s current proposal system allocates up to a fixed 10% of the block subsidy toward proposals on a cycle of 16,616 blocks, which approximates one calendar month in duration, through a “superblock”. Proposal funding is dispersed in a coinbase transaction to the address specified in the proposal if the proposal receives enough support from the MNOs. The proposal system prioritizes payment to the highest ranking proposals until the available funding is exhausted for each superblock, subject to the constraint that each proposal must reach 10% “net votes”. Proposals meeting these criteria are funded with newly created Dash. More information on the functioning of the current system is found in the governance section of the Dash documentation.

While this system has been effective at funding Dash’s development, there are several issues and concerns that emerged over the years. The current proposal system lacks incentives for MNOs to focus on value-creating proposals, resulting in approval of high-cost proposals that deliver limited long-term value. In addition, MNOs lacked the flexibility to increase proposal funding beyond 10%, potentially forcing valued teams to disband due to even temporary price declines.

The root-causes of these issues are as follows:
  1. There is no personal and immediate cost for MNOs to approve low-value proposals, as it has no impact on their Dash-denominated rewards.
  2. The monthly budget is relatively small and has no ability to increase capacity if needed for large proposals or to accommodate price declines.
Community discussions revealed support for expanding the budget, maintaining a proposal cap, and introducing incentives for MNOs to restrain spending. Both decision proposals carry these features, but differ in the approach and specific effects on miners, masternodes, and proposal owners.

4. DCG Plan

DCG seeks to alleviate both of the above root-causes in a low risk manner. The changes we propose would provide economic incentives for MNOs to spend proposal funds more judiciously, and would also provide greater flexibility to expand proposal funding if needed. The proposal also seeks to limit the associated risks these changes introduce to network economics through several mechanisms discussed below. These risks are outlined along with how the proposal manages those risks.

DCG engaged with the community to explore a range of possible solutions through a series of Q&A sessions, Dash Forum discussions, and updates on our quarterly calls. We also engaged our engineering team, external experts, and prominent community members to develop a perspective on the optimal solution.

We operated under a number of constraints, including security-related constraints recommended by our development team. In addition to simple mathematical constraints regarding the desired economic impact, we also had to take into consideration the effect this proposal would have on all stakeholders within the Dash ecosystem, e.g., masternodes, miners, users, and proposal owners - all of whom are essential for a successful transition.

The primary aim of this proposal is to improve the effectiveness of our proposal system while limiting the potential for new risks to the network’s economic system.

4.1 Guiding Principles

Because of the inherent sensitivity of changes to Dash’s complex economics relative to other networks, DCG favored solutions that provided benefits with more predictable effects and was especially mindful of potential risks, including transition risks, implementation risks, security risks, and economic risks (e.g., potential for price bubbles or crashes due to behavior changes). As illustrated by price changes driven by past changes to network economics, even seemingly small changes carry the potential to introduce unforeseen consequences.

4.2 Proposed Changes

DCG proposes the following changes to the proposal system:
  1. Increase the proposal budget limit from the current 10% of the total monthly block subsidy to 20% of the total monthly block subsidy. No other changes to the proposal approval process would be made, including the minimum net-vote threshold.
  2. Allocate any unused block subsidy associated with a superblock’s proposal funding toward masternode and miner rewards in the following 16,616 block budget cycle. The incremental allocation would be distributed evenly over the cycle. For example, if 8,308 Dash were unallocated during a cycle, the block subsidy for masternodes and miners would increase by 0.5 Dash per block in the subsequent cycle (8,308 Dash / 16,616 blocks = 0.5 Dash / block).
The resulting split in any period will be a function of the approved proposal budget from the prior period and the current split of non-proposal funds between miners and masternodes. While the miner / masternode reward allocation split is scheduled to change on a quarterly basis due to the previously approved reallocation proposal (approved in July) recently deployed to the network in v0.16, it will eventually settle at 40% / 60% permanently once the reallocation schedule is complete. The following illustration displays theoretical allocations of the block subsidy assuming various approved budgets once the reallocation is complete.

4.3 Benefits and Rationale

As the table above demonstrates, this set of changes provides MNOs with the ability to change the size of the budget over a greater range to meet the needs of the network, or create “surge capacity” to better digest large one-time costs. The maximum budget size would double to 20% of the block subsidy. This could enable new use cases, such as funding for large investments for the DIF without the need to build large reserves first. Note: even at the maximum proposal allocation size, the MNOs would receive a larger portion of the block reward than they do today (i.e., 48% vs. 45% currently).

Concurrently, this approach creates direct financial incentives for MNOs to spend available funding judiciously, because approving additional spending would directly impact their expected rewards over the following budget cycle. This incentive eliminates the risk that MNOs would approve proposals simply to maximize the budget allocation.

Perhaps counterintuitively, miners benefit from an approach that varies the miner reward. This is because as constructed, the reward schedule amplifies miner earnings most during profitable market conditions - conditions in which miners make nearly all profits. Mining margins are usually thin in most market conditions (e.g., flat or declining prices). Even if the asset price increases, if the increase is gradual, this will not result in excess mining profits, since there will be ample time for new mining equipment to be manufactured and installed, keeping profit margins contained. In instances when Dash prices increase rapidly, it is likely that the requested budget requests would drop in Dash-denominated terms. This would lead to larger miner rewards at precisely the times when Dash prices were increasing. This means that miner rewards would grow to amplify profits in instances where mining profits are highest (i.e., periods of rapid price appreciation).

Another benefit to this approach is that by structuring the reward allocation such that both miners and masternodes jointly absorb the variability caused by the proposal system funding changes each month, the economic risks outlined in the next section are reduced. The risk section goes into greater details.

Lastly, because no portion of the block subsidy goes unused, it provides certainty over Dash’s max supply. While minor, it is a benefit worth noting.

4.4 Risk Management

4.4.1 Economic risks

There are two primary economic risks that result from implementing financial incentives for MNOs to reduce spending. The first risk is that MNOs could become overly parsimonious to the detriment of the network or cut funding to valuable projects for short-term benefit. The Dash network is dependent on funded projects for continuing software development, local adoption efforts, and business development. It is impossible ahead of time for anyone to know the extent to which the financial incentives may impact MNO voting behavior. If it impacts behavior less than we expect, the severity of this risk is contained. However, a change in behavior that results in defunding projects to an extent that puts the future of Dash at risk could possibly be severe and even irreversible if it impacted price substantially.

The second risk is that the resulting MNO reward variation introduces stability risks in the number of masternodes the network can support. In a worst-case scenario, this could lead to a vicious cycle. Specifically, if a low Dash price leads to a larger share of the budget to be allocated over a sustained period, this would result in lower masternode rewards. Lower masternode rewards - if sustained - would likely lead to fewer MNOs (caused by masternode liquidations from ROI-motivated investors). Masternode collateral liquidations could cause the price to fall further, exacerbating the issue and causing an even higher share of the proposal system funding to be used.

The above economic risks are the main reasons why the reward volatility is absorbed by both miners and masternodes in this proposal. This has the effect of narrowing the possible masternode rewards to a more predictable and stable range, helping to mitigate both risks. By dampening some of the impact to MNO rewards, these rewards will be more stable from month-to-month (resulting in greater price, rewards, and proposal funding stability).

Related to this, it is worth noting that the block reward reallocation proposal’s table that predicted a range of MN count was predicated on this proposal’s design. There is therefore a link between the MN rewards contemplated in this proposal and the range of likely MN counts previously presented, and therefore to the resulting circulating supply growth rates. See the table near the bottom of the block reward reallocation proposal that passed in July for more information.

Proponents of the alternate proposal argue that placing 100% of the variability resulting from proposal approvals is “appropriate since MNOs carry 100% of the proposal-funding responsibility”. However, requiring each masternode to assume approximately one 5,000th of the proposal cost (since there are ~5,000 masternodes) creates misaligned incentives, considering each masternode receives only about one 10,000th of the benefits (e.g., their share of the total supply). We agree that creating “personal and immediate” costs to MNOs for funding proposals is desirable - and both proposals do just that. However, we caution against moving from one extreme (in which MNOs incur no costs) to the other (in which MNOs collectively incur 100% of the costs), and advocate for an approach that better aligns the costs and benefits of the decision-makers.

In fact, the argument that MNOs should bear 100% of the costs is antithetical to the stated goal to “increase the value of funded proposals”. Because of the misaligned incentives, MNOs are incentivized to reject a subset of the proposals that would have been value-creating (defined as benefit exceeding cost), if the value created is less than ~100% return. Such a high bar may leave opportunities on the table and discourage the network from pursuing exploratory opportunities or new teams. Intelligent risk-taking and opportunity exploration remain critical to the future success of Dash.

Proponents of the alternative proposal also argue that “proposals are essentially paid 100% by ‘other people’, i.e., the costs are socialized”. It is a logical fallacy to position only the costs, but not the benefits, through a lens of “socialization”. The implied presumption is that sharing of the costs of a proposal is negative. In a parallel argument, contributing 1% of the capital toward an investment would mean the full investment costs are “socialized” among the investors (i.e., ‘other people’). This is simply an illogical interpretation of a shared cost / shared benefit arrangement. While 99.99% of the costs are borne by others, it is likewise true that 99.99% of the benefit will accrue to others; similar in nature to 1% of the profits from an investor would accrue to the person that contributed 1% of the investment. This is not a negative, it is necessary to efficiently align incentives.

Finally, given masternodes are already unwilling to approve the full available monthly budget, we do not believe there are risks that this proposal carries insufficient incentives for MNOs to restrain spending should the price of Dash increase substantially. Every proposal approved will directly and immediately impact masternode rewards.

4.4.2 Security risks

A variable miner reward can affect hashrate on the network, so introducing a variable miner reward could impact month-to-month levels of security. There are at least two reasons to believe these risks are extremely low. First, the primary driver of any variation in miner rewards will continue to derive from Dash’s market price. Miners are already accustomed to 20% swings in price from month-to-month, and these changes are absorbed effectively by the mining apparatus serving the network. Even in other ASIC networks like Bitcoin, the most recent 50% reduction in reward subsidy was barely noticeable in the network hashrates.

This evidence suggests that the dominant chain for a mining algorithm can absorb large changes in mining rewards while safely maintaining network security. There is no evidence that small short-term changes in mining rewards will destabilize network security. By definition, the maximum monthly change in miner rewards must be less than 20% (and likely much smaller given entities like DCG, the DIF, and others regularly consume a relatively stable portion of the rewards). We therefore view this risk as negligible.

Proponents of the alternative proposal point out that “shifting part of the variability to miners... makes the mining allocation unpredictable from month to month”. This is a misleading statement, because DCG’s proposal lock-in a range of minimum and maximum rewards a miner can expect (about 80% of the maximum possible reward is guaranteed), and it does not affect the fee portion of the reward, further dampening the impact over time as fees grow and the block subsidy shrinks. The likely variability in the value of mining rewards due to variations in month-to-month proposal system allocations will be small in comparison to the month-to-month market price fluctuations already endured by miners in a given month. Further, they make no arguments as to why mining reward variability might lead to an undesirable outcome for the miners or the network as a whole. To the contrary, discussions with miners lead to the conclusion that variability is anticipated to be financially beneficial to their operations.

4.4.3 Migration risks

Strong miner support remains essential for facilitating hard forks in a manner that is safe for our users. ChainLocks are highly effective at preventing 51% attacks, but they offer little benefit toward enforcing a protocol change. This plan benefits miners in two ways that are likely to incentivize their support. First, the likelihood that the MNOs spend more than 10% of the available budget on a regular basis is perceived by most miners as low, given that they often spend significantly less than that amount today without incentives to spend judiciously. Therefore, they feel it is likely that their allocation may increase on average. Second, they benefit from the variation in reward as outlined in the benefits section. We therefore view transition risks as low.

Implementation risks:The required changes to the proposal system are relatively straightforward from a coding perspective. Proposal submission, voting, and allocation will function identically as it does today. The resulting “unused budget” is easily calculated and applied to the subsequent cycle’s block subsidy. We anticipate no significant risks due to unpredictable implementation timelines or a high likelihood of security vulnerabilities.

4.5 Summary

This proposal encourages good stewardship of proposal funding, provides greater flexibility to utilize a larger budget if the need arises, and provides benefits for miners, masternodes, and proposal owners. Importantly, the proposal is mindful of potential risks that could arise from variable network economics, and attempts to reduce those risks by spreading the variability over both masternodes and miners.

5 Appendix

DCG introduced the idea of “Improving Dash as a Store of Value” on December 11, 2019. DCG then engaged in a series of Q&A and discussions held through various communication channels such as Discord, The Dash Forum, Zoom and Telegram from June-July 2020. The following links document these interactions, as well as other relevant information:
Related Discord polls:
Side by side decision proposal example from 2018 - Visual Dash Rebrand / Logo proposals (process reference):

Show full description ...

Discussion: Should we fund this proposal?

Submit comment
-1 point,5 days ago
I fear both proposals will either allow MNOs to just keep more money even incentivizing funding nothing at all or just give more money to the over funded core group.

A better plan would be to reduce the mining rewards to say 35% and adding those to the potential treasury budget. (Since Dash miners are responsible for only a small part of the network) MNOs should not be rewarded for funding nothing at all.

Voting no x16.
0 points,5 days ago
Given they hold 1,000 per masternode, discontinuing funding for development and growth for a small % increase in the ROI seems an extremely unlikely outcome. Most MNOs recognize that these efforts are necessary for the network to compete... and in fact it is one of the differentiators that attract most MNOs to Dash in the first place. IMO, the fear you are expressing seems unlikely to actually occur.
2 points,11 days ago
Same as Quizzie and DeepBlue for me, extenting to 20% is big NO. Why no option to keep 10% and make other proposed change? or maybe we could go to 12% but please no more.
1 point,10 days ago
One reason why the two changes are coupled together is that many people would oppose one change without the other. For example, one might oppose expansion of the budget without the incentives to restrain spending. One may also oppose voting on financial incentives to restrain spending first without the benefit of a more flexible proposal system.

The proposal that prevails in this round will need to be voted in over the current system, so if you oppose any expansion of the maximum budget size, you can vote against it in the next decision vote to be held in December. If that proposal fails, we could vote on other options, such as voting on only the incentives to restrain spending. However, I suspect those isolated options would have a lower support level, especially anything that expands the budget without financial impacts for MNOs to approve budget items.

There is no perfect sequence in which to vote on each item, and it is impossible to please everyone. However, we followed a pretty rigorous process to identify the combination of changes that we feel would be beneficial to the network and supported by most masternodes.
-1 point,10 days ago
The budget is not being raised the game theory is being improved, we will never see the upper limit again unless is for something very important. The network will no longer be approving low value proposals as it will be coming out of masternodes and miners pockets. Is a big improvement from the current system, my prediction is it will be hard to even see 10% effectively be used anymore.
3 points,10 days ago
True true, but this will keep a door open with a 20% leaking Dash posibility to low values, 0 ROI proposals too, and potential whales voting heist. I don't like leave door opens ;)
5 points,19 days ago
Voting definite NO to both proposals. We should definitely not be increasing the budget to 20%. The reasons are as follows:

1. The DAO is still currently not making sound business decisions on the right projects to fund. It is not a matter of the funds that will help MNOs to make good decisions it is clear to me that the great majority of MNOs voting do not have sufficient business experience to be making wise decisions on projects. What happens is the MNO keep voting in useless projects that bring little to no value in to Dash such as KuvaCash and Alt36 etc etc all of which I warned the community not to vote for from the very beginning. However MNOs kept voting these useless projects in. Wako Drako of KuvaTrash just kept asking for more and more funds and the MNOs just kept voting in this useless project again and again. I shudder to think how much greater damage would have been caused to the network if the budget would have gone up to 20% for that useless project and others like it.

One MNO that was dead set against my feedback on KuvaCash was a massage therapist for god sake. That was the extent of their business experience! They were dead set against my feedback but as it turns out everything I stated to the community has happened with the KuvaCash project. I've also had others who vocalised why I was so wrong with Kuva. Again, none of them came across as having real world business experience. I have had several thousands of face to face business interviews and been in business for 30 years compare that to some programmer or massage therapist. Yet I'm debating with these types of people! Its simply crazy.

Increasing the budget to 20% should definitely not happen in my opinion until the MNO network has put procedures in place to be able to make sound business decisions.

2. DCG would be the main beneficiary for the increase budget. I have made several valid criticisms on the spending of DCG being inefficient e.g. their office space at 55K which has been proven to be empty on every time a trusted member of the DASH community had made spot checks on their office. I have raised this point many times in the DCG funding proposals however they have not responded. These concerns were raised before the coronavirus. Paying 55K for an office space is pure waste when office space could be purchased as needed by the day or even by the meeting. When there were plenty of funds available to DCG CMO wanted to spend 1 million on google ads. This money could have been spent in a much more effective way that google ads. I raised concerns of this spend at the time in the DCG proposal. My concern is the more funds available the more the funds will be seen as available to use however DCG wants. The reality is 200K per month is more than enough for DCG. They just need to learn to be more thrifty with the money.

3. Extra money = downward pressure on Dash price.

If we could be making sound business decisions on projects then I would consider voting in a 20% flex increase in proposals but right now I do not have confidence in the DAO to make sound governance decisions.

People are under the impression that the Governance system decisions should me made under a purely democratic system. I disagree with a pure democratic approach because it is clear the people making the voting decisions don't have the experience to do so reliably. What I believe is better is to use the democratic process to vote in experienced Business MNOs who have proven business experience and also have the time to assess projects properly. MNOs would then vote who the business MNO making the decisions would be. The decisions and reasons would be published before voting ends so that MNOs can support it or not if it is based on sound decisions.

The only drawback I see from my suggestion is that MNOs like myself may not have the time to fully assess projects because this would take a considerable amount of time away from my current business.

Surprisingly Socrates was also against democracy in the pure sense – see this video:

Socrates rationale was that if you were to take a boat trip across the ocean would you hire inexperienced people to run the ship or would you hire people with experience in navigation, and how to operate a ship?

I have been developing a series of strategies on how better governance decisions can be made which you can read on the forum. These were:

1. Overview to improving the Dash Governance system. Highlighting the issues we currently have.

2. Defining and Agreeing Dash Core Values, Goals and Objectives. What do we stand for and what don't we stand for?

3. Dash's target markets:

4. Dash decentralization charter:

5. Dash masternode association

I had planned to write some further posts to these series but I stopped due to some derailing posts.

I wanted to write the following;

6. A requirement that a full Business plan must be submitting with each funding request.

7. Video interviews need to be made that are submitted with the Governance proposal owner to answer qualifying questions from MNOs directly with the proposal owners. This gives an opportunity to get to know what the proposal owner really is like and if they would fit with the Dash project.

8. Dash Watch PreValidation of the proposal owners to determine the following:
8.1 The proposal owners can validate they have the skill set they claim they have
8.2 Background check on each proposal owner to ensure they have no criminal background. This information can be kept confidential but checks need to be made to ensure we are not dealing with crooks.

If we had these steps we would have weeded out many of the low quality projects that just wanted to take our money and return nothing of value in return.

The above steps are steps that can actually lead to better Governance decisions.

Therefore I'm voting NO for both proposals until such time we have a decent governance decision making system in place to weed out low quality individuals and projects. That includes disruptive individuals who are intent on destabilising the Dash decentralized project.
1 point,17 days ago
If you don't like either plan your best bet might be to choose the lesser of evils this round, and then vote for status quo next cycle.

If your view is that MNOs don't have the business experience to make good decisions then the MNO plan is a better fail safe. Why? Because under that plan MNOs have to pay more out of their own pockets to fund proposals. You don't have to have business sense to want to keep your money, when in doubt. The MNO plan leverages that natural tendency more.

(p.s. I read your posts about "decentralized governance" and replied there regarding those aspects)
-6 points,18 days ago

On the above, we do agree. Democracy is broken for Dash and without strategic governance it’s going to be the same old same.

Read the Kuva Whitepaper if you want to understand how we do strategic governance, and fix the broken Dash model. It means funds don’t go scattergun to crap proposals, and stakeholders have to think a lot more clearly as to who they allocate the strategic governance to.

Here you go -

In the case of this proposal vote YES on this for the sole reason that it gets MNO’s thinking where they want to put their money, even if it is a clear bribe and opens the faucet for DCG to leech even more funding from the DAO (they are actually the only group that could pull this proposal off).

4 points,17 days ago
No one cares about your whitepaper mate.
0 points,15 days ago
Only people who have a brain care, mate.
-5 points,18 days ago
"disruptive individuals who are intent on destabilising [sic] the Dash decentralized project."

With all due respect DeepBlue, I believe you are describing yourself with this statement. We have a system and it's not perfect, but it's working quite well IMHO. The DAO is always making mistakes, but we have had a great many successes lately and I don't think I need to list them.

"If we had these steps we would have weeded out many of the low quality projects that just wanted to take our money and return nothing of value in return."

At some point in the future I am going to ask for you to apologize publicly to the DAO for your irresponsible support of DashRetail.
1 point,17 days ago
@geert regarding DashRetail I shared my actual experiences that I've had with DashRetail over the last 8 months. As far as I can see it was in a neutral manner. For the record MNOs can read my feedback here:

You will notice that I also gave information on all of my experience including the delayed supply of POS systems which was also part of my experience and I also asked Ash when the systems would arrive in Venezuela. That seems pretty much neutral feedback that I think is of value to the network to know. I guess you disagree with that.

I have also have an update on the POS systems from Ash last week. I can confirm now that Ash has received the POS systems. He sent me a video showing the boxes that were containing the units.

I also have messages from Ash stating that he has agreed to send out the first batch of POS systems without charge to the teams in Venezuela after they have been properly tested. Ash ordered 50 units and the majority of these are going to the teams in Venezuela. Ash stated to me that he is covering the cost of these units and he does not want the teams to pay him back for this batch of units. He said the teams can keep all the profits on this first batch.

He also stated that he will be sending out around 5000 POS system cards later and he will pay for those upfront as well but the teams can pay him back for the cost of the cards once they are sold.

So, according to you, I should not share my actual experiences regarding DashRetail with the network, and, in addition, that I should apologise for sharing my actual experiences?

I've had about 10 calls with Ash and several hundred messages on Signal over this year. Ash has always been responsive to requests for information. We spent many hours discussing the specifications on the POS systems based on feedback from DMP. That is just my experience. This is not an endorsement it is the actual experience I've had. PERIOD.

May I ask how many calls have you had directly with Ash of Dash Retail?
-3 points,17 days ago
I don't do private calls. Everything I have to say regarding POs and their performance or lack thereof is done publicly. The reason I will ask you to apologize is that you represent yourself as such a savvy businessperson, yet you don't have the courage to recognize that DR has completely failed to deliver on their promises and what they were paid to accomplish. And you continue to support what is either incompetence or worse on the part of the PO.

DashRetail version 1.0 LTS has yet to be delivered because there are no terms and conditions anywhere -- we don't even know what entity is hosting it. For some reason the PO is quite shy about actually supporting this creation. LTS stands for LONG TERM SUPPORT.

As of today, DashRetail has no users. And without a website describing what it is, who is hosting it, and the terms and conditions, we don't even have the possibility of users.
2 points,18 days ago
This guy geert is just a brainless idiot that trolls everyone. Look at his other postings.
6 points,19 days ago
Wait a minute! So Masternodes are spending the revenue of miners on proposals only they can vote for? Hell No! LMAO.
3 points,18 days ago
Apparently, yes. Lmao also.
3 points,23 days ago
So the difference between DCG and MNO proposals basically boils down to size of proposal budget influencing just MNO compensation (MNO proposal) or both MNO and miner compensation (DCG proposal).

The issue is, variable miner compensation definitely introduces unintended incentive for miners to leave the network depending on proposal budget size. Are those two things something we really do want to depend on each other?

I mean, MNO compensation being tied to a proposal budget is definitely a good thing, and a great incentive. But why should network security provided by miners be tied to proposal budget? Do we really need less security when proposal budget is larger, or more security when it's smaller?

And most importantly, do we want MNOs to have to choose between defunding a proposal in order to attract more miners?

I certainly don't. I will be voting no to this proposal.
0 points,22 days ago
Yep. Let's boil it down in another way:
The MNO plan says "at any given time we have a fixed security need, so keep the mining allocation fixed"
The DCG plan says "at all times we think masternodes and miners should be paid at a 60/40 ratio". Why? Hell if I know, it's just a magic number that will almost always be misaligned.
0 points,23 days ago
I'd like to clarify that miner rewards are a consequence of the combination of 1) a fixed supply emission, 2) variable proposal funding (depending on what proposals are approved), and 3) better alignment of costs & benefits on the part of decision-makers (MNOs). Burdening the MNOs with 100% of the costs of an approved proposal when they can expect to receive only about half of the benefits could lead to a stingy DAO. The miner allocation is a result of the above constraints, not a primary objective of the design, i.e., a mechanism for the MNOs to allocate funding to security.

Unfortunately, any design, by definition, cannot provide 1-3 above AND provide a fixed mining reward allocation. The primary decision therefore, is what is more important... alignment of decision-maker incentives to ensure they can't enrich themselves by defunding good proposals? Or having a fixed mining reward? There are significant risks that asking the MNOs to fully fund proposals may cause them to become overly stingy. No one yet knows if that is true or not. By definition, no one can claim to know how MNOs will react. Therefore, we should move in that direction, but not to the other extreme. The miner reward variability is a consequence of that design decision.
1 point,23 days ago
I understand that the intent was to spread the cost of additional budget between MNOs and miners, but a side effect is that it introduces a new, variable incentive to miners, which is not aligned to the benefit of the network.

MNOs being too stingy is a risk, true. However, by spreading costs over both MNOs and miners, you haven't eliminated that risk, you've just decreased it a little, at a cost of another risk (miners leaving/miners volatility).
0 points,22 days ago
You are wrong on this and reading too mucho into it, the cost should be spread between miners and masternodes, just as much as the savings should be spread between miners and masternodes. This wont affect anything, the moment you introduce a cost to the decision makers they will be more prudent. Miners have no misalignment whatsoever. My prediction is we wont be going above 10% for anything other than very specific and important projects with clear benefits. The moment you introduce the cost, people will know they have to be careful as any approved proposal should generate more value than the missed income in their pockets. This is an improvement and the DCG plan is the best option. Miners are already doing their part as we can see on the adoption of v16. the DCG plan is the only prudent and fair option.
0 points,22 days ago
As pointed out in the proposal, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that even 50% variations in mining reward has minimal impact on hashrate/security. At worst, you may lose some old slow inefficient miners, but in now way could network security be considered a risk. Just look at what happened after the last Bitcoin halving in May. It was a non-event for hashrate.
0 points,18 days ago

You need to resign.

The fact that you go and post a turboboosted copypasta of last months Kuvacash ‘bribe’ proposal because you haven’t got an original idea in your head is yet another demonstration of your complete incompetence and lack of vision for Dash.

That said, and copypasta aside, vote YES. At least it’s a little spanner in the works around incentives and shows that Dash might change.

If the MNO’s feel that money can either go into their pockets or into worthless proposals, they will also think twice about voting for a DCG that is run like a communist party, with zero accountability and minimal performance, with a visionless coward and liar as its lead.

1 point,14 days ago
You're consumed by greed, envy, and anger Andreiko. I cannot call you slothful, but then again all your labors seem to be in the service of greed, envy and anger.
1 point,21 days ago
I agree that effect probably won't be noticeable, at least with the current price, but that's not a reason to introduce misaligned incentive which might create an issue in the future, or when some other variable changes.
6 points,24 days ago
Firstly thank you to the Trust Protectors, especially Mark Mason, for facilitating the process for this joint submission; and to everyone who's been working on both drafts for the last several weeks.

I agree with the decision to bump the max treasury allocation to 20%, which these two proposals share in common; and I also agree with having MN rewards tied in some way to the unused treasury budget. However I am supporting the MNO plan because I think the MNO plan has a more accurate understanding of the purpose of the entities in our DAO. Miners provide an important service to the network: security through proof of work hashing. We (the DAO) have already voted recently on a block reward allocation in recognition that our original allocation was paying for hashing in excess of what is needed to keep the network secure. This involved directly reducing miner rewards. Even if we grant that miners prefer to have this "variable reward", why should the DAO now move back in the other direction to incentivize more hashing, when we literally just voted that we don't need as much hashing?

I'd like to see the 20% of our block reward carved out for governance/treasury. With the MNO plan, every penny from that 20% will be either used to fund a proposal, or to incentivize better quality voting (in the form of MN rewards from unallocated treasury).

In reviewing the risk assessments from both plans, I believe that the risks associated with both plans are low and I have confidence that either one could be activated successfully.

Thanks again to @Rion, @hilawe, Ryan Taylor and the DCG team for agreeing to work with the Trust Protectors so we can have both of these options available to choose (along with the status quo).
3 points,24 days ago
What ever happened to being against MNO's voting themselves benefits? It's ok as long as it's directly from the blockchain but not from Kuva? Doesn't matter though. In these proposals I see a DAO drowning in the ocean, flapping around to keep its head above water. Waiting for the Evolution life raft, but the life raft hasn't even made it into testnet yet. Better than nothing. I agree that the MNO-plan is better because MNO's seriously need to stop funding projects bringing no value, and the only way to have them do this is to give them pure sugar as a reward for not maxing Mom's credit card on candy corn again. DCG's proposal of having miner rewards connected to Dash's proposal budget is pointless except to say we're scared of what miners will do to us if we don't lick their boots.
0 points,24 days ago
The non-diplomatic assessment we can all appreciate :)
One small note though, the "voting themselves benefits" thing happened mostly in the already-approved reallocation proposal. This is simply how much "incentive to be judicious" we want - a little (DCG plan), or a little more (MNO plan).
-1 point,24 days ago
Vote the MNO plan dashunicorn. Code is law, and it gives more control to MNO’s.

Deeper changes can be made later.

4 points,24 days ago
I will be forced to vote down both DCG Plan & the MNO plan, as they both allow for extending our budget to 20%.
Extending the budget from 10% to anything higher, is a big NO for me.

My personal opinion :

More then 10% budget --> More selling of Dash on the market by those projects that receive Dash funding --> More Sell Pressure & Reduced Dash Store of Value (by making masternodes less attractive to invest in). I think it directly undermines our whole blockreward allocation change.

Also there are large masternode-owning entities active on our network, i don't think it is wise to give them influence not only over budget proposals, but over masternode blockrewards as well, specially if they can influence it negatively (making the masternode rewards lower by -6%).
2 points,24 days ago
I haven't made up my mind on this questions, but I am concerned for a similar but distinct reason: Extending the budget over the current 10% seems to reward the players in our system (DCG specifically) despite abject failure on their part keeping Dash valuable.

Unless I missed it, there is no mention of DCG commitment to keep themselves restricted to 60% of the current available budget. This then seems like a huge increase in what they are able to ask for while maintaining that promise.

BabyGiraffe can you comment on how you plan to handle this?
1 point,24 days ago
If what we were talking about was simply an increase from 10 to 20 percent, I would agree with you that would introduce a hazard of introducing waste. However, this proposal makes it more difficult for proposals to pass by introducing a financial impact to MNOs for approving proposals. Introducing a cost would make it very difficult for DCG - or any entity - to use the expanded budget in a wasteful manner without providing clear value to the network.

DCG has no immediate intentions to expand team size or our ask of the network. However, if we did feel expanding DCG's budget would add value to the network, we have committed to introducing any incremental beyond the current 6% of the block reward as a discrete proposal. In other words, we will reduce our ask to 30% of the revised 20% budget allocation should this proposal pass, and we would not continue requesting 60% of the larger budget. Any expansion would be specifically voted on.
2 points,24 days ago
This is exactly what I have been wanting to hear from DCG, that they will not rule out taking some of the expanded budget, not that DCG should, imho, but I have wanted clarity on this issue.
2 points,24 days ago
Awesome thank you for the clarification.
-2 points,24 days ago
And a few months later, Nevolution still not in sight and the price still crashing, you’ll simply up the amount DCG requests.

You need to step down Ryan, and let someone else steer the tugboat that Dash has become. You are an adequate general manager, but have proven to be an atrocious CEO. A liar and a coward, and with zero innovation in your being, and you know it. You know how short the ‘memory’ is of MNO’s and you plan to take advantage of it.


-2 points,24 days ago
Vote YES Quizzie, for once this is actually an interesting proposal.
-1 point,24 days ago
I understand your perspective here. For you, and anyone who is against raising the limit to 20%, voting down both proposals right now might not be your best strategy.

If your goal is to have less DASH going to POs, you might be better off choosing the option that makes it less likely for MNOs to fund proposals, which is the MNO Plan.
-1 point,24 days ago
Copying my reply on this topic from our Forum discussion...

"While I appreciate the point about direct price impact of proposals, appling this logic alone would mean that we should eliminate all proposal funding, including the existing 10% as well... but focusing exclusively on the cost side ignores the benefits the proposal system brings to the network. Yes, it is true that the vast majority of budget proposal funding tends to be sold to pay for expenses. The question is whether those expenditures bring more value to the network than they cost. A good proposal system will therefore align decisions around both the benefits and the cost of each proposal. Right now, there is no direct cost to MNOs approving a budget request. Introducing a cost should reduce wasteful proposals, which is necessary to avoid waste if the maximum allocation is to be expanded."
0 points,23 days ago
Lets take the Alt36 proposal as example. Lets say we introduce a Dash budget that can flex to 20% . To get to that 20% that additional 10% comes either from masternodes (-10% MNO Plan) or from masternodes & miners (-6% & -4% DCG Plan).

Now lets assume a very large proposal emerges on our network, in scale that of the Alt36 proposal and with clear benefits to the Dash network and it gets approved by expanding the Dash budget to 20%.

For many months the masternodes or miners/masternodes gets cut back on their block rewards to keep this proposal funded. And then for some reason, that very large proposal fails to meet its objectives, due to unforeseen external forces (in Alt36 case, their official partners not willing to use Dash as their official forefront payment provider). Making the cutbacks to the blockrewards of Masternodes / masternodes & miners all these months pointless.

I see it as gambling on the success of proposals. Blockrewards of masternodes / masternodes & miners should not be intertwined like that. They are not now, they should not be in the future.
0 points,24 days ago
This proposal gives more power to the DAO, and that extra power might be needed some day soon. The extra ten percent might be a life-saver if Dash were to dip down to $30 for instance.

There is no reason the DAO should not have this option. We have to trust that the DAO will act in its own self-interest and act responsibly. If you don't trust the DAO you should not be here.
0 points,24 days ago
On the other hand, if Dash goes back to $1,000, we will have the ability to distribute excess funds back to the MNOs and miners. The current "use it or lose it" treasury has proven to be comically wasteful when Dash is riding high.
0 points,24 days ago
0 points,24 days ago
After a thorough review of all of the points made by both proposals, I will be supporting this one. This one more aligns with my personal vision for Dash, that we are all in this together. Sharing the lows of our struggles and the highs of our triumphs with our miner friends is important to me. Miners continue to be a big part of Dash, and with the latest upgrade, they are already submitting to receiving less than MNOs. I believe the MNO plan will further alienate the miners from the process leading to possible future animosity and messy upgrades. If we continue to include the miners and their fate continues to be tied with ours, I believe that will go a long way to maintaining that cohesiveness that we will need as we face mounting external pressures.

Having said that, it would be nice to hear from miners directly what they think of these two plans. I will reserve the right to change my vote upon input from some miners.

Barring that, I will be voting YES on this proposal, and NO on the MNO proposal.
2 points,24 days ago
At least we can all go down together holding hands!
2 points,24 days ago
Hi Tao, just curious whether we made it clear that the miners may more likely be worse off under DCG's plan. It all depends on whether MNOs allocate more or less than 10% to proposals. If we allocate more, miners are worse off under DCG's plan.
-4 points,24 days ago
I’m loving this copypasta proposal! Basically a copy of the main innovation from the Kuva proposal but wow, it’s waaaay improved!

Now MN’s can claw back 20% of the superblock and can allocate the funds to themselves if they don’t like what they see, aaaaaand - DCG will basically get twice the funding available to themselves - two birds with one stone, incredible!

Yep, instead of Kuva this time, it’s DCG doing the bribing because they actually need twice the funds they’re currently getting to continue to operate. This is because the ineffectual Ryan Taylor has created such an inefficient mess of DCG the price has tanked (and continues to tank) and Neverlution is an insipid version of the innovation that was expected by all of us who invested in Dash. Hang on MNO’s! Keep voting in our salaries, while staring at Neverlution - an innovation that is way behind in its market relevance. But let’s pay you all a REAL bribe to shut your collective mouths!

That said, vote YES to something that is at least a spanner in the works and gets MNO’s to think about where they put their money - towards garbage proposals, towards something investable or directly in their pockets.

And YES take the extra 20% ‘bribe’ - its double what Kuva could have offered you last month, and actually the first time DCG is giving you something of value to put directly in your pockets! Forget the ‘ethics’ and all that other nonsense you were bleating about last month with Kuva, and take the bribe! Code is law.

You cannot make this stuff up, I love it! Peace and love to you all!