Proposal “decision-proposal-change-proposal-system“ (Closed)Back

Title:Decision Proposal: Increase Proposal System Flexibility And Efficiency
Owner:glennaustin
One-time payment: 5 DASH (485 USD)
Completed payments: no payments occurred yet (1 month remaining)
Payment start/end: 2020-12-25 / 2021-01-23 (added on 2020-12-10)
Final voting deadline: in passed
Votes: 690 Yes / 459 No / 0 Abstain
External information: app.dashnexus.org/proposals/decision-proposal-change-proposal-system/overview

Proposal description

Decision Proposal: Increase Proposal System Flexibility and Efficiency

Introduction
This is a decision proposal that - if approved - will increase the proposal system’s spending limit (i.e., its flexibility) and incentivize greater focus on the value of approved funding proposals (i.e., its efficiency). Similar to the visual identity / rebranding proposal from 2018, two proposals were submitted for evaluation in the November voting cycle in order to present the network with two options. Those two proposals were mutually exclusive and this proposal received a higher number of net votes. The November cycle, therefore, represented “Phase 1” in which the two solutions competed against one another. This proposal - “Phase 2” - will determine whether the favored solution will be implemented and will change the way Dash’s proposal system functions.

The primary objective of this proposal is to provide the network with greater flexibility over proposal spending, while better aligning MNO incentives to avoid spending network resources on low-value proposals. It will also establish certainty over Dash’s final circulating supply.

Background
Dash Core Group identified several issues with network economics and incentives, and presented its initial findings in December 2019 at DCG’s Open House, available to view as a presentation titled “Improving Dash as a Store of Value”.

The presentation explored a number of unique attributes of the Dash network’s incentives and economics, and presented a hypothesis regarding the impact those attributes have had on Dash’s market performance and long-term price volatility.

These issues were addressed partially through an independent, but related proposal (passed in the July voting cycle), which approved a reallocation of the block subsidy. The changes were incorporated into v0.16 of Dash Core, which was released to mainnet on September 30, 2020. This proposal did not address any changes to the proposal system itself, which is the subject of this proposal.

Dash’s current proposal system allocates up to a fixed 10% of the block subsidy toward proposals on a cycle of 16,616 blocks, which approximates one calendar month in duration, through a “superblock”. Proposal funding is dispersed in a coinbase transaction to the address specified in the proposal if the proposal receives enough support from the MNOs. The proposal system prioritizes payment to the highest ranking proposals until the available funding is exhausted for each superblock, subject to the constraint that each proposal must reach 10% “net votes”. Proposals meeting these criteria are funded with newly created Dash. More information on the functioning of the current system is found in the governance section of the Dash documentation.

While this system has been effective at funding Dash’s development, there are several issues and concerns that emerged over the years. The current proposal system lacks incentives for MNOs to focus on value-creating proposals when Dash prices are high (and the budget is large), resulting in approval of high-cost proposals that deliver limited long-term value. Conversely, when the price of Dash has been low, the MNOs lacked the flexibility to increase proposal funding beyond 10%, potentially forcing valued teams to disband due to even temporary price declines.

The root-causes of these issues are as follows:
  1. There is no “personal and immediate cost" for MNOs to approve low-value proposals, as it has no impact on their Dash-denominated rewards.
  2. The monthly budget is relatively small and has no ability to increase capacity if needed for large proposals or to accommodate price declines.

Proposed Solution

DCG seeks to alleviate both of the above root-causes in a low risk manner. The changes we propose would provide economic incentives for MNOs to spend proposal funds more judiciously, and would also provide greater flexibility to expand proposal funding if needed. This proposal also seeks to limit the associated risks these changes introduce to network economics through several mechanisms discussed below. These risks are outlined along with how the proposal manages those risks.

DCG engaged with the community to explore a range of possible solutions through a series of Q&A sessions, Dash Forum discussions, and updates on our quarterly calls. We also engaged our engineering team, external experts, and prominent community members to develop a perspective on the optimal solution.

We operated under a number of constraints, including security-related constraints recommended by our development team. In addition to simple mathematical constraints regarding the desired economic impact, we also had to take into consideration the effect this proposal would have on all stakeholders within the Dash ecosystem, e.g., masternodes, miners, users, and proposal owners - all of whom are essential for a successful transition.

The primary aim of this proposal is to improve the effectiveness of our proposal system while limiting the potential for new risks to the network’s economic system.

Guiding Principles
Because of the inherent sensitivity of changes to Dash’s complex economics relative to other networks, DCG favored solutions that provided benefits with more predictable effects and was especially mindful of potential risks, including transition risks, implementation risks, security risks, and economic risks (e.g., potential for price bubbles or crashes due to behavior changes). As illustrated by price changes driven by past changes to network economics, even seemingly small changes carry the potential to introduce unforeseen consequences.

Proposed Changes

DCG proposes the following changes to the proposal system:
  1. Increase the proposal budget limit from the current 10% of the total monthly block subsidy to 20% of the total monthly block subsidy. No other changes to the proposal approval process would be made, including the minimum net-vote threshold.
  2. Allocate any unused block subsidy associated with a superblock’s proposal funding toward masternode and miner rewards in the following 16,616 block budget cycle. The incremental allocation would be distributed evenly over the cycle. For example, if 8,308 Dash were unallocated during a cycle, the block subsidy for masternodes and miners would increase by 0.5 Dash per block in the subsequent cycle (8,308 Dash / 16,616 blocks = 0.5 Dash / block).

The resulting split in any period will be a function of the approved proposal budget from the prior period and the current split of non-proposal funds between miners and masternodes. While the miner / masternode reward allocation split is scheduled to change on a quarterly basis due to the previously approved reallocation proposal (approved in July) recently deployed to the network in v0.16, it will eventually settle at 40% / 60% permanently once the reallocation is complete. The following illustration displays theoretical allocations of the block subsidy assuming various approved budgets once the reallocation is complete.

Approved Budget Allocation                      Resulting Miner Reward                    Resulting MNO Reward                    
0%40%60%
5%38%57%
10%36%54%
15%34%51%
20%32%48%


For full technical details of the proposed implementation, click here: Draft Proposal System DIP

Benefits and Rationale
As the table above demonstrates, this set of changes provides MNOs with the ability to change the size of the budget over a greater range to meet the needs of the network, or create “surge capacity” to better digest large one-time costs. The maximum budget size would double to 20% of the block subsidy. This could enable new use cases, such as funding for large investments for the DIF without the need to build large reserves first. Note: even at the maximum proposal allocation size, the MNOs would receive a larger portion of the block reward than they did prior to the reallocation (i.e., 48% vs. 45% previously).

Concurrently, this approach creates direct financial incentives for MNOs to spend available funding judiciously, because approving additional spending would directly impact their expected rewards over the following budget cycle. This incentive eliminates the risk that MNOs would approve proposals simply to maximize the budget allocation. Doing so would reduce their own rewards significantly.

Perhaps counterintuitively, miners benefit from an approach that varies the miner reward. This is because as constructed, the reward schedule amplifies miner earnings most during profitable market conditions - conditions in which miners make nearly all profits. Mining margins are usually thin in most market conditions (e.g., flat or declining prices). Even if the asset price increases, if the increase is gradual, this will not result in excess mining profits, since there will be ample time for new mining equipment to be manufactured and installed, keeping profit margins contained. In instances when Dash prices increase rapidly, it is likely that the requested budget requests would drop in Dash-denominated terms. This would lead to larger miner rewards at precisely the times when Dash prices were increasing. This means that miner rewards would grow to amplify profits in instances where mining profits are highest (i.e., periods of rapid price appreciation).

Another benefit to this approach is that by structuring the reward allocation such that both miners and masternodes jointly absorb the variability caused by the proposal system funding changes each month, the economic risks outlined in the next section are reduced. The risk section goes into greater details.

Lastly, because no portion of the block subsidy goes unused, it provides certainty over Dash’s max supply. While minor, it is a benefit worth noting.

Risk Management
Economic Risks:
There are two primary economic risks that result from implementing financial incentives for MNOs to reduce spending. The first risk is that MNOs could become overly parsimonious to the detriment of the network or cut funding to valuable projects for short-term benefit. The Dash network is dependent on funded projects for continuing software development, local adoption efforts, and business development. It is impossible ahead of time for anyone to know the extent to which the financial incentives may impact MNO voting behavior. If it impacts behavior less than we expect, the severity of this risk is contained. However, a change in behavior that results in defunding projects to an extent that puts the future of Dash at risk could possibly be severe and even irreversible if it impacted price substantially.

The second risk is that the resulting MNO reward variation introduces stability risks in the number of masternodes the network can support. In a worst-case scenario, this could lead to a vicious cycle. Specifically, if a low Dash price leads to a larger share of the budget to be allocated over a sustained period, this would result in lower masternode rewards. Lower masternode rewards - if sustained - would likely lead to fewer MNOs (caused by masternode liquidations from ROI-motivated investors). Masternode collateral liquidations could cause the price to fall further, exacerbating the issue and causing an even higher share of the proposal system funding to be used.

The above economic risks are the main reasons why the reward volatility is absorbed by both miners and masternodes in this proposal. This has the effect of narrowing the possible masternode rewards to a predictable and stable range, helping to mitigate both risks. By dampening some of the impact to MNO rewards, these rewards will be more stable from month-to-month (resulting in greater price, rewards, and proposal funding stability).

Security Risks:
A variable miner reward can affect hashrate on the network, so introducing a variable miner reward could impact month-to-month levels of security. There are at least two reasons to believe these risks are extremely low. First, the primary driver of any variation in miner rewards will continue to derive from Dash’s market price. Miners are already accustomed to 20% swings in price from month-to-month, and these changes are absorbed effectively by the mining apparatus serving the network. Even in other ASIC networks like Bitcoin, the most recent 50% reduction in reward subsidy was barely noticeable in the network hashrates.

https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/bitcoin-hashrate.html#1y

This evidence suggests that the dominant chain for a mining algorithm can absorb large changes in mining rewards while safely maintaining network security. There is no evidence that small short-term changes in mining rewards will destabilize network security. By definition, the maximum monthly change in miner rewards must be less than 20% (and likely much smaller given entities like DCG, the DIF, and others regularly consume a relatively stable portion of the rewards). We therefore view this risk as negligible.

Migration Risks:
Strong miner support remains essential for facilitating hard forks in a manner that is safe for our users. ChainLocks are highly effective at preventing 51% attacks, but they offer little benefit toward enforcing a protocol change. This plan benefits miners in two ways that are likely to incentivize their support. First, the likelihood that the MNOs spend more than 10% of the available budget on a regular basis is perceived by most miners as low, given that they often spend significantly less than that amount today without incentives to spend judiciously. Therefore, they feel it is likely that their allocation may increase on average. Second, they benefit from the variation in reward as outlined in the benefits section. We therefore view transition risks as low.

Implementation Risks:
The required changes to the proposal system are relatively straightforward from a coding perspective. Proposal submission, voting, and allocation will function identically as it does today. The resulting “unused budget” is easily calculated and applied to the subsequent cycle’s block subsidy. We anticipate no significant risks due to unpredictable implementation timelines or a high likelihood of security vulnerabilities.

Summary
This proposal encourages good stewardship of proposal funding, provides greater flexibility to utilize a larger budget if the need arises, and provides benefits for miners, masternodes, and proposal owners. Importantly, the proposal is mindful of potential risks that could arise from variable network economics, and attempts to reduce those risks by spreading the variability over both masternodes and miners.

Show full description ...

Discussion: Should we fund this proposal?

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1 point,26 days ago
hipnotic said:
“I already have no confidence in MNO's ability to make good decisions, so increasing the budget would be crazy.”
“If I don't trust the MNO's to spend the current budget wisely, why would I give them more money?”


It’s frustrating that you and others here don’t understand why economic value incentives should be optimized. In your opinion, you think that if we do improve the incentives, then MNOs will react to the change by overspending (or underspending) because they’re all stupid and irrational or whatever. You think YOU know better than everyone else when it comes to deciding what adds value to Dash. And therefore, your solution to the voters’ poor decision-making is to misallocate block rewards (supply inflation) in a way that directly increases relative downward pressure on Dash’s price and would likely prevent some value-adding +ev proposals from being funded.

+Ev proposals are called +ev proposals because they add more value than their cost. => As many +ev proposals as the block reward budget can afford, after fully paying for continuous network security and functionality, should be included and funded. A 20% treasury cap does this.

So then if MNOs were to make bad decisions or mistakes in their assessment of how much value will be added by proposals, their mistakes would hurt their investment’s value. That perfect incentive is what will make MNOs take voting most seriously.

To keep incentives misaligned instead - just because of opinions, emotions, or guesses - is definitely the incorrect thing to do. The correct optimal solution is more likely to maximize Dash’s expected value.

Please have the humility to seek the actual true solution that would maximize Dash’s value. If you own one or more masternodes, you have a large investment in Dash. You should realize that you will benefit more from implementing the best economic solution that adds maximum value to Dash than from basing this decision on personal opinions. I want 2021 to be really amazing for Dash, and I think this change to more optimal incentives needs to happen as soon as possible for Dash to advance and succeed this year. Choose the correct economic solution. Anything else would make/keep things worse.

Happy New Year Dash Community!! :)
Reply
1 point,28 days ago
This is an easy no vote for me. I already have no confidence in MNO's ability to make good decisions, so increasing the budget would be crazy. Until I see a proposal that will overhaul the proposal system to let qualified people make smart educated business decisions with the budget, I'm voting no.
Reply
-2 points,28 days ago
I assume you count yourself as one of those qualified people. Why don't you show us your linkedIn profile so we can review your qualifications?
Reply
1 point,26 days ago
Your flooding of the comment section surely isnt helping the case here lol
Reply
5 points,1 month ago
Hard to vote for something that implies various changes, where you could be ok with one point and Not ok with the other.
For this vote for example it would maybe have been more suitable to divide it in basics step changes:
-1st: Implementation of Flexibility 0-10% ?
-2nd: Increase Max-cap (12, 15 , 20%)?
Reply
-1 point,1 month ago
Under the plan, even if the budget is maxed-out, MNOs still get 48% of the reward, which is more than the 45% we get now. I don't understand your concern. Increasing the *potential* budget just adds flexibility.
Reply
2 points,1 month ago
Not true, after the recent reallocation the MN:miner ratio will become 54% and 36% respectively.
48% is definitely less than 54%, and the remainder (4%) is not magically appearing, but would be taken from miners, who already took a hit.
Reply
-1 point,1 month ago
I know this is not easy or enjoyable...

In this proposal we're asking the DAO to give up some power. We are asking MNOs to give up the power to tax and spend money that does not belong to them. No one likes to give up power and privilege, but we are asking this for the good of the coin. Experience has shown us that this unfortunate feature of the DAO is wasteful and dangerous.

I have been here for five years. I was not active until the rise of DashCrypto, when it occurred me that the DAO was funding its own enemy and headed for disaster. DashCrypto attempted to fork and appropriate the Dash brand. This was absolutely terrifying because a lot of people here did not understand the danger of allowing an anon with a private LLC to hoover up our intellectual property. People said things like, "It's ok, Dash is DECENTRALIZED!" Luckily we were able to destroy the DashCrypto cancer but it shook me, and I resigned myself to staying involved here and trying to keep the DAO from doing stupid shit.

I hope you can understand that it's not just about waste. For the safety of the enterprise we should give up this power.
Reply
2 points,1 month ago
Stop begging crybaby, you are so pathetic.
We real Dash supporters NEVER GIVE UP !!!!
Reply
-2 points,1 month ago
I'm not being a crybaby. I'm trying to clarify things. People's minds are clouded right now with everything that's going on. They're stressed out. People can't think straight when they're under stress.

We have a chance to improve things and I would rather we not delay or blow that chance.
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
How fortunate for us, to have you clarifying things, uncloud our puny minds and for teaching us how to properly think!! /sarcasmoff
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5146206/

People become risk-averse when they're stressed. This whole proposal is about risk and reward.
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
Final comment for the peeps here who cannot connect the ultimate dot...

When you overestimate risks you can MISS OPPORTUNITIES. So many people I tried to convince to buy BTC when it was sub $100 and Dash when it was sub $10. Some were millionaires who didn't want to risk ten grand!
Reply
-2 points,1 month ago
From the study abstract:

"...when stressed, individuals tend to make more habitual responses than goal-directed choices, be less likely to adjust their initial judgment, and rely more on gut feelings in social situations. It is possible that stress influences the arbitration between the emotion responses in subcortical regions and deliberative processes in the prefrontal cortex, so that final decisions are based on unexamined innate responses."
Reply
2 points,1 month ago
quizzie's concerns about increasing the treasury cap above 10% do not account for the positive value proposition that Dash's treasury now allows.

The network needs to spend its block reward on mining security, masternode services, and treasury budget. When Chain Locks were implemented, that changed our network's spending needs; it freed up some potential room in the budget. It is prudent to now shift rewards to an optimal payout level to maximize the value of Dash: that means maximizing the treasury proposals that deliver more expected value to Dash (+ev) than their cost, as far as possible up to the point that it does not to interfere with the continuity of both functionality and security. Every +ev proposal, by definition, is expected to add more value to Dash than its cost to the network. Since Chain Locks provided more room to safely allocate budget to treasury, it is now objectively correct, for the optimal economics of Dash, to do so. This is not a matter of preference or opinion, it is the solution to an optimization problem.

qwizzie said:
"My personal opinion :
More than 10% budget --> More selling of Dash on the market by those projects that receive Dash funding --> More Sell Pressure & Reduced Dash Store of Value (by making masternodes less attractive to invest in). It directly undermines our whole blockreward allocation change."

You are misunderstanding the concept of +ev proposals. If a proposal owner's "selling of Dash on the market" does indeed create more downward pressure on Dash than the expected future upward buying pressure generated by the proposal's efforts, then it would not be a +ev proposal.

We should ideally have as many +ev passing proposals as the overall budget can afford once all of the functionality and security needs are fully met. DCG suggests a 20% treasury cap, and I agree with that amount. If you see it otherwise, please justify why you think it would ever make sense to thwart the judicious use of budget for +ev, value-adding proposals.

If it's because you don't trust MNOs to make good voting decisions, that is not a valid reason to misalign incentives according to your personal preferences rather than have them be optimally aligned for a maximized return of value.


It is important that we implement DCG's proposal right away so that Dash will be as economically competitive as possible in 2021. Big money is entering the crypto space, and Dash's fundamentals need to be figured out and optimized now. If we can reduce the circulating supply inflation to a competitive and stable level, it will help give Dash a better chance of outperforming other cryptos, moving up on the charts and gaining more exposure and recognition and respect, and eventually being a contender for mass adoption as digital cash and as a social payments platform.

If you own one or more masternodes, I'm sure you would love to see the value of Dash rise as much as possible. Let's all look at this objectively with a rational open mind, and let's find the truly best solution to make it happen. Please evaluate my arguments without an emotional prejudice to be disagreeable, but see the economic logic of my arguments. Thanks.
Reply
0 points,28 days ago
If I don't trust the MNO's to spend the current budget wisely, why would I give them more money?
Reply
-2 points,1 month ago
Qwizzie has made eight posts here so far and he's mentioned "10%" in seven of them. In one post I believe he is implying that DCG has a secret cache of masternodes that they run.

I'm starting to wonder about this person.
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
I think the resistance against extending the budget beyond the 10% among masternode operators has been highly underestimated from the start, not only by Ryan but by masternode operators involved with the MNO plan as well. I am blaming that on a limited research phase, that ultimately failed to collect feedback from a large group of masternode operators.
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
MNO plan included resistance, @qwizzie , It was presented as a compromise to the DCG plan, the vote so far shows that MNOs are not likely to support a no compromise Treasury reallocation. Period.
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
I disagree, looking at all the comments the no votes are specifically against extending the 10%. The MNO plan and the DCG plan were both for extending the 10%. There was no compromise in there. A compromise would have been leaving the budget at 10% and only focus on the leftover funds.
Reply
-1 point,1 month ago
If you think about it, the way the DAO works now, where MNOs give out funds that don't cost them anything, but which are in fact a tax upon every Dash hodler, it's a bit pompous and a bit corrupt. IT'S NO BETTER THAN HOW THE THE US CONGRESS WORKS.

And this is probably why we end up funding such losers. And why we end up funding them WAY too long.
Reply
-1 point,1 month ago
We can't just poll MNOs and then sit on our asses if they don't want or can't be bothered with considering ways to improve the DAO. We have to try to persuade them.

It's good that this proposal is here and it only cost five Dash.
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
We have not even had time to weigh the full effect of the reward reallocation on Dash valuation. Voting NO, let's watch what Dash valuation does before we rush out and raise the Treasury Cap. At this Dash price, I even question how long we will need to allocate 10%.
Reply
5 points,1 month ago
Basically the Tl;Dr for my comment below is that this push to 'change the treasury and voting system' is based on a false premise and is therefore a form of concern trolling. Dash's treasury spending is NOT WILD or OUT OF CONTROL. We are not suffering price action because of selling (10% once a month vs THE OTHER 90% ALL MONTH). The people making these arguments are basing them on falsehoods and unsubstantiated concerns, which means they're arguing in bad faith. That is enough reason to vote No!
Reply
-1 point,1 month ago
Six net upvotes for this retarded, maniacal rant. SMH. You've got minions my friend.

Hmm. Let me think. Who do I know around here who has minions? And who do I know that writes like a roid-raging megalomaniac stuck in a traffic jam?

Nah. Can't be!
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
When you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth. It is unfortunate that you have chosen this path. But it wasn't going to be a secret forever.
Reply
-8 points,1 month ago
You've created quite an entertaining narrative there. You should consider writing fiction for a living. Here's the deal...

When the treasury system was created, it was assumed that MNOs would recognize that every Dash created via the proposal system was not in fact free money but had a cost associated with it. These Dash are INFLATIONARY and put downward pressure on the value of the coin. Evan, bless his heart, thought MNOs were smart enough to grok this. He thought wrong.

The other problem is that the 10% budget is sometimes too much and sometimes too little if you take into consideration the price of Dash and what is on the DAO's plate in a given cycle.

We are fixing both these little glitches with this upgrade to the DAO.
Reply
3 points,1 month ago
Here you are 1 year ago fudding Dash Mall and Parking, the team that has granted us the most adoption in Venezuela with active users, thousands of transactions per month (1,200-1,300). If we would've listened to you, Dash Mall and Parking would've been smaller/defunded and our Venezuelan growth decapitated.

https://www.dashcentral.org/p/dashmallandparkingcontinuedgrowth

geert
1 point,1 year ago
"I don't understand why you are asking for more money in this proposal than the last one. IMHO, you are asking for too much money. You should need LESS as you gain experience with your processes and cut waste. And IMHO, you should be focused on making your enterprise self-sufficient, and not asking for more and more funds."

>free money but had a cost associated with it.

Strawman. NO ONE THINKS the treasury is 'free money'. Where are you even getting that from? You're being a concern troll. That is not a valid thing to be concerned about, i.e. whether or not the treasury is considered 'free money' or not. Who cares?? You're making a mountain out of an artificial molehill that YOU CREATED IN YOUR HEAD. You are CREATING A FAKE 'concern' ('buh buh MuH NoNFree CapitaLz').

THEY ARE ONLY INFLATIONARY WITHIN THE ORIGINAL SOCIAL AGREEMENT THAT DETERMINED THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF COINS. This maximum is NOT removed no matter how many proposals get passed, so YOU. ARE. LYING! Lying in an attempt to use a BULLSHIT argument to trick us into stopping the treasury from functioning.

Why don't we get rid of the masternodes then, by your logic? The Miners too? THEY GET 90% OF THE BUDGET AND THEY SELL EVERYDAY SO WHY THE HELL ARE YOU PRETENDING LIKE THE TREASURY IS SOME COST SINK?! You are LYING, that's why. The treasury is where the new Dash community comes from.

You want to get rid of this, which means YOU DON'T WANT Dash to get new users. Which means YOU HAVE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST in owning masternodes and voting here. You should be ASHAMED OF YOURSELF for being a LOW LIFE AND A CHEATER!

> "The other problem is that the 10% budget is sometimes too much and sometimes too little if you take into consideration the price of Dash and what is on the DAO's plate in a given cycle."

Its NEVER too much. The budget doesn't get paid out unless there are YES VOTES which means that we shouldn't 'get rid of the budget', we should IMPROVE THE MNO'S INFO AND VOTING PROCESSES. If no worthy proposals are there NOTHING GETS CREATED!

You're not 'fixing' anything except from the perspective of our jealous competition who do not wish to see us outpace them any more. You're a LIAR as I proved when I defeated you last year and its nice to see you're forced to be a 'nice-shill' instead of the aggressive 'bad-shill' you were before.
Reply
-5 points,1 month ago
You take everything to an absurd conclusion. I want to implement this promising improvement to the DAO, and therefore I'm a monster who hates Dash. There is an expression for this type of fallacy: Reductio ad absurdum.

And BTW, I simply thought DMAP was asking for too much money given the cost of living in Venezuela, which I researched...

https://www.expatistan.com/cost-of-living/country/venezuela?currency=USD
Reply
2 points,1 month ago
>You take everything to an absurd conclusion

There is NOTHING absurd about it. These are the STATED END GOALS of those individuals against the proposal system. You are DELIBERATELY AND MALICIOUSLY ignoring this possibility because you likely have selfish interests that do not benefit the network.

You pretend its a 'promising improvement' when you can't defend yourself from the accusation that the 'problem' that you're 'improving' is NOT a problem at all. Which means you have bad motives and are not being forthcoming or honest in your discourse.

'Reductio ad absurdum' arguments are NOT fallacious arguments, you apparently do not understand what they are.

From wiki:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum

" It can be used to disprove a statement by showing that it would inevitably lead to a ridiculous, absurd, or impractical conclusion,[3] or to prove a statement by showing that if it were false, then the result would be absurd or impossible.[4][5]

Traced back to classical Greek philosophy in Aristotle's Prior Analytics[5] (Greek: ἡ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξις, lit. "demonstration to the impossible", 62b), **this technique has been used throughout history in both formal mathematical and philosophical reasoning, as well as in debate.**[6]"

And:

"Reductio ad absurdum was used throughout Greek philosophy. The earliest example of a reductio argument can be found in a satirical poem attributed to Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 570 – c. 475 BCE).[9]"

Showing that these are valid arguments, not (necessarily) fallacious ones, so you're once again parroting falsehood as evidence for bullshit.

>And BTW, I simply thought DMAP was asking for too much money given the cost of living in Venezuela, which I researched...

Yeah except that's A DUMB THING TO DO. We WANT more DASH to be spread becaus the more Dash is available and the easier it is to get, the greater and faster our adoption and spread will be. IT IS INSANITY to wish to defund successful teams, which proves you have either irrational (unlikely) or otherwise-vested interests from the DAO. Either way your argument is STUPID and you shoudl be ASHAMED to have made it.

The whole point of cryptocurrencies is to create and spread wealth for people. That's where the drive for adoption comes from, freedom from fiat and the ability to earn a wage in a decentralized and permissionless manner. If you were truly for Dash, you WOULD NEVER FUCKING BE AGAINST THAT YOU CLOWN!!
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
You're not just emotionally out of control; you're also wrong:

http://www2.humboldt.edu/act/HTML/tests/fallacy6/6.8a.html

Reductio ad absurdum is also known as "reducing to an absurdity." It involves characterizing an opposing argument in such a way that it seems to be ridiculous, or the consequences of the position seem ridiculous. It can be ridiculous in the sense that the argument seems silly, or ridiculous in the sense that that no reasonable person would take such a position.
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
A Reductio ad absurdum FALLACY is different from a Reductio ad absurdum ARGUMENT. Again,

"This technique has been used throughout history in both formal mathematical and philosophical reasoning, as well as in debate."

Reductio ad absurdum arguments are used in mathematics for "proof by contradiction"

"In logic and mathematics, proof by contradiction is a form of proof that establishes the truth or the validity of a proposition, by showing that assuming the proposition to be false leads to a contradiction.

Proof by contradiction is also known as indirect proof, proof by assuming the opposite, and reductio ad impossibile.[1]"

Here is an example of a valid Reductio ad absurdum argument:

"There is no smallest positive rational number because, if there were, then it could be divided by two to get a smaller one."

"The second example is a mathematical proof by contradiction (also known as an indirect proof[7]), which argues that the denial of the premise would result in a logical contradiction (there is a "smallest" number and yet there is a number smaller than it).[8]"

Like I said, YOU ARE WRONG!
Reply
-1 point,1 month ago
This:

"There is no smallest positive rational number because, if there were, then it could be divided by two to get a smaller one."

Is a valid Reductio ad absurdum because it is NOT a fallacy (i.e. its conclusion logically follows from its premises), and because it also doesn't seek to misrepresent the opponent's position as absurd. In order to transform that into a reductio ad absurdum FALLACY, you would need to MISREPRESENT your opponents position as follows:

There is no smallest positive NATURAL number because, if there were, then it could be divided by two to get a smaller one."

Not only is this argument only fallacious because there actually is a smallest NATURAL number: 1 (or 0 depending on your definition), but also, this argument WOULD NEED TO BE A MISREPRESENTATION of your opponents argument, i.e. you'd have to claim that they were saying NATURAL numbers, when they actual were referring to RATIONAL numbers.

**THAT** would be a reductio ad absurdum FALLACY. Your problem is that I'm NOT DOING THAT! I am NOT misrepresenting your position absurdly so as to be impossible to counterattack, I am ACCURATELY fighting against your stated goals of defunding treasury proposals using absurd reasoning.

The issue here is that you ARE INCORRECTLY mischaracterizing my argument as FALLACIOUS when they are not so. My argument is supported by the evidence as I have written in my previous posts. YOU HAVE TO PROVE MY EVIDENCE WRONG BEFORE YOU CAN CALL MY CONCLUSIONS FALSE AND FALLACIOUS. Otherwise you're being dishonest!
Reply
-2 points,1 month ago
And btw, this:

"I want to implement this promising improvement to the DAO, and therefore I'm a monster who hates Dash."

is a strawman argument. I never made that claim. I explicitly claimed that your deliberate denial of even the possibility of negative consequences coming from this proposal (in the form of defunding our burgeoning global DAOs), as well as your previously, personally-stated, right here on DashCentral comments fudding those proposals and advocacy of them being defunded, both of these things mean that you have bad motives for the DAO.

Anyone who is in favor of Dash and wishes to see it succeed will consider both POSTIVE AND NEGATIVE sides when evaluating proposals. You are DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE NEGATIVES to this proposal.

What's worse, you're advocating others do the same. It is therefore NOT FALLACIOUS AT ALL to conclude that you are beholden to interests outside the DAO and are attempting to use your influence to sway us in a destructive direction.

If you disagree, stop PRETENDING YOU KNOW LOGIC and prove my assertions wrong.
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
@geert
quote: "The other problem is that the 10% budget is sometimes too much and sometimes too little if you take into consideration the price of Dash and what is on the DAO's plate in a given cycle."

These are blatant LIES straight from hell.

Whenever the 10% budget is "too much" as you claim, we simply approve less than the 10% budget limit.
The current working of the DAO, and how it worked since its inception in 2015, does NOT force us to spend the full limit of 10%. Heck, we could vote to spend ZERO at a given month, if we truly wanted to.
This is a non-argument.

In case it is "too little", there is a SIMPLE possibility of increasing the budget to 20% by KEEPING OUR DAO WORKING IN THE SAME WAY IT DOES NOW, simply by extending the blockreward to 110% as i already laidout below, and WITHOUT CUTTING INTO MINER AND MNO REWARDS !!
Of course it would increase our final Max Supply by a little, but really nothing unbearable.
Afaik, this solution was NEVER EVEN CONSIDERED, LET ALONE HONESTLY DEBATED.

But before raising the spending limit of the DAO, we must first decide whether it truly is needed and whether it makes any sense, and carefully weighing the risks of such a possibility.
There may be some pro and cons both, for keeping 10% and also for raising the budget limit.

MNOs should have the ability to VOTE SOLELY on keeping the budget limit or changing the budget limit,
but this proposal connects the expansion of the budget(doubling), with a new way it is implemented,
by cutting into the rewards of miners and MNOs and making us pay directly for Upvoting proposals.
It will cause strong hesitation with YES-votes and will be responsible for easy & fast NO-votes.

There is really no reason for linking an important governance question like raising the budget limit,
with a new and radical change in the way the DAO is working.
Such improper rushing and burying any real discussion of alternative viable options,
deserves automatic rejection.
Reply
4 points,1 month ago
Voting NO! on this for sure. I'm coming off of my vacation just to post this. The consequences of this proposal are most likely going to be that the treasury proposals are massively defunded. Then, when that happens they'll try to split the project between 'pro-proposal' people and 'anti-proposal' people. But there shouldn't be anyone in the Dash network that is Anti-Dash-Proposals. Its literally in the name, so the ANTI-PROPOSAL SIDE MUST BE SHILLS AND INFILTRATORS, by deductive reasoning Although Ryan Taylor and infamous liar and anti-treasury proposal MNO geert both disagree that this is a likelihood, this take is quite naive IMO.

Why? For the simple reason that these goals and motivations have already been stated, multiple times on multiple proposals over the last two years. They've ALREADY told us that they don't like most of our proposals, especially the ones in Venezuela, where we see all our growth, and that they want to see these proposals defunded. They're "fine" with DCG, maybe andyfreer (for now). But they really don't like the Venezuelan, Brazilian, Nigerian, Thai and East Asian (DashNext) proposals.

But the main reason to vote NO! is that the entire rationale behind this shift and change is based on a false premise. Quoting the proposal creator himself:

"This will introduce incentives for *reducing treasury spending. The current system has no direct incentive at all to control spending.*" - babygiraffe

This is incorrect, WILDLY incorrect. There is a cap on the treasury at 10%. That is a VERY STRONG INCENTIVE (i.e. unmovable) to only spend 10% of the budget. In other words, 20%, 30%, 11%, 40%, 79%, none of these percentage values are possible for the budget.

Which means that the budget is restricted to 10% or less. Which means that it is NOT CORRECT that there are no "direct incentives at all" to control spending, the strongest incentive to control spending of the budget is the fact that you can't get more than 10% of it. Therefore this statement must be false.

"Out of control spending" is spending that is NOT limited. So therefore, obviously, having a LIMIT at 10% is THE OPPOSITE OF THAT, and that statement must BY DEFINITION be incorrect. Mr. Taylor, you may want to revise.

Secondly, not only is there a cap at 10%, *but those funds are NOT allocated unless they're voted YES! for*. Which means that if there are no YES votes for proposals, then the budget DOESN'T GET PAID OUT AT ALL. No Yes! votes means no spending. This is another "thing" that is the COMPLETE OPPOSITE of "out of control spending".

This is actually, WELL-CONTROLLED spending. Again, Mr. Taylor, you may wish to revise your comment and resubmit. Your influence and network affect are rather large in this community, please do not squander them by stating things that are not true. The idea that there is "Wild and uncontrolled spending" at the treasury IS NOT *AT ALL* CORRECT.

Here's my take on what's really going on here. Let's just get down to brass tacks here, because the shills and infiltrators that HATE OUR COIN will NEVER STOP UNTIL WE STOP THEM. They come from other coins like Nano, decred, yes even BCH and LTC, BTC and ESPECIALLY MONERO. Basically THE ENTIRE rest of the POW and first gen. cryptocurrency community IS CLANDESTINELY INVESTED IN THE FAILURE OF DASH!! They're not ignoring us out of ignorance but out of SPITE and MALICE hoping we DIE before they have to acknowledge that we already won the race.

The evidence for this assertion is laid out quite well both on reddit, and even here on DashCentral. For reddit, you can go to any of the subs of those coins, type in "DASH" in the search and you can witness THESE COMMUNITIES DELIBERATELY AND OPENLY BEING DISHONEST ABOUT DASH! You can also witness MNOs deliberately LYING and making arguments in favor of things that are against the best interest of the network! As a quick example, you can go here:

"Why is Nano better than Dash?"
https://www.reddit.com/r/nanocurrency/comments/k3yezg/why_is_nano_better_than_dash/

Witness THE LIES about our coin! Like this comment:

Podcastsandpot
25 points ·
19 days ago

"Too many things to even get into, there’s so much wrong with dash and Evan duffield and how dash got started. I used to be a holder in 2016 until I smartened up and woke up to all the creepiness surrounding that coin."

or go to https://www.reddit.com/r/DashUncensored/

and

https://www.reddit.com/r/DashUncensored/comments/jq3v1l/improve_proposal_system_competing_proposals/

to watch MONERO SHILL privacytothetop777 and MONERO INFILTRATOR (I proved this last year both here on DC and on reddit) HenryGeorgist, as well as xkcd SPINNING LIES to give platform to defund our proposals. Kuvacash came for DCG, these infiltrators are coming for the treasury.

The nano comment above has 25 upvotes for vague, unsourced and unsubstantiated SPECULATION! What is the meaning and origin of this behavior? Why are coins like Nano and others lying about Dash? Why are monero shills like privacytothetop777 and henrygeorgist advocating to shut down our treasury and stop funding proposals? The Monero community engaged in *7 YEARS* of relentless fud and BULLYING of the Dash community. This bullying gave everyone in the community a negative impression of Dash and caused us to be SHUNNED.

Its also key to realize that these infiltrators and shills COMPLETELY IGNORE THIS BULLYING! They never reference it as a reason for price decline, lack of market sentiment and positivity, or anything! They just PRETEND LIKE IT DOESN'T EXIST. Just like the cryptocommunities PRETEND that Dash doesn't exist. Shills share styles and tactics, so they're easy to spot when they use the same techniques.

This market rigging also gave these communities A FALSE SENSE OF SUPERIORITY TOWARDS US. So, even though Dash is faster, more decentralized, has funding, governance, soon platform and other benefits that puts us LIGHT YEARS AHEAD OF THEM, ***they deliberately refuse to acknowledge all of this due to these above two reasons!***

I.e. they think they're "better than us". Victims of bullying usually have a hard time finding sympathy, because most people would rather just be a bully than stand up to one! Being a bully is EASY because BULLIES ONLY PICK ON THOSE WEAKER THAN THEM! So when you PUNCH THEM IN THE FACE, they leave you alone. Standing up to a bully, however, requires courage, guts and skill, which is a lot of work and the VAST majority of people are unwilling to do this work.

So you get what you see here. But these lies and this deliberate ignoring of Dash are NOT the end of this behavior! The logical yet unstated conclusion of this artificially adopted mentality is THAT DASH MUST BE DESTROYED! This is the FINAL GOAL of the behavior by the monero community's to illegally rig the price and gaslight of our coin; both of these are anti-competitive tactics that should've gotten them shunned from the entire crypto community long ago for being malicious bad actors. But THAT WOULD'VE REQUIRE CONFRONTING A BULLY!

And so, since NOBODY WANTS TO FIGHT THE BULLY, the bully grows stronger. The bully takes more kids' lunch money. The bully coerces people into using their SHITCOIN because 'they'll beat you up online if you talk well about Dash and don't praise monero'. So with that as a backdrop, you can understand then why it would make 'sense' for these people who have already proven to be dishonest, dishonorable and unethical cheaters and sore-losers to also attempt to TRICK THE MNOS into destroying our DAO, by incentivizing them to not fund proposals based on FALSE REASONING ('wasteful' treasury spending).
Reply
-2 points,1 month ago
I'm sure most sane rational people can recognise the delusional nonsense this guy's spouting, but since my name was mentioned, I'll respond.

He says he "proved" this (I've not seen it, so can't comment) and calls me a Monero infiltrator and claims I want to shut down the treasury and stop funding proposals... This is utter nonsense, and would be laughable if not for the misunderstandings inherent in text-based communication. I am a fan of Monero, but I am also a DASH fan (and MNO obviously), as well as a fan of many others. Like many real people, I support multiple projects. I'm a fan of any projects that promote more economic freedom for all people of the world, whether that's Dash, Monero, Bitcoin, or anything else.

See how I actually speak about both DASH and Monero. Read a few of my reddit comments, which have received praise in both Dash and Monero communities. I aim to be fair and truthful as I see it, but you can judge for yourself:

https://www.reddit.com/r/dashpay/comments/ctggqr/comment/exkqp00?context=1

https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/evnl8f/comment/ffxgubn?context=1

https://www.reddit.com/r/dashpay/comments/kg8obs/comment/ggdpthk?context=1

Ask yourself, would someone that lists DASH's treasury, the first and longest-running DAO, and the ability to fund multiple decentralized teams around the world as a primary differentiating factor over other projects, seem like someone that wants to "shut down" the treasury? Shame on you for saying that. And shame on you for promoting fear and tribalism.
Reply
2 points,1 month ago
This goes to you, henrygeorgist:
Try harder. Everyone here knows you are an infiltrator and monero shill who is hell-bent on destroying Dash.
How long did you keep your masternode? 1 or 2 days ??
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
henrygeorgist, you shut up here! this is no forum for XMR trolls

rango, will any amount of proof ever be enough for you to finally disable or delete the account of such malevolent Dash-haters?
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
You can pretend to be ignorant. But I was watching you shill monero and attack Dash on Youtube and reddit, and proved it over a year ago.

https://www.reddit.com/r/dashpay/comments/dctvfz/dash_latam_requests_your_feedback/

As further evidence I was correct in calling out masternode infiltrators, the user henry georgist is a confirmed masternode owner. Here he is on youtube flagrantly shilling Monero and fudding/lying about Dash.

Naomi Brockwell - War against Monero & privacy coins, & Dash's new Coinbase listing

He must've changed his username, before it was something like henry_georgie, now its just georgie:

Georgie

1 week ago

So is XRP and XLM. But none of them are decentralized, including dash. Masternodes are heavily centralized and also dash is not fungible

.

Georgie

1 week ago

How does it feel being brain dead Chris ? DASH HAS A CEO LMAO ITS A CORPORATION NOT A DECENTRALIZED COMMUNITY. Not fungible, privacy is garbage, centralized masternodes, etc

.

Georgie

1 week ago

Optional privacy isn’t real privacy

.

Georgie

2 weeks ago

@Naomi Brockwell Centralized masternodes. Not asic resistant. Not fungible. Privacy is bad cause of low anonymity sets. Transaction fee's too high. Too slow to use as digital cash. So actually he's right, it's Digital Trash.

This user, who is clearly lying and shilling for monero, has come out in support of George Donnelly's 'work' in Venezuela, which means, he is happy to see the destruction of our growth there. Again he is a verified masternode owner which means I was correct and we have an masternode infiltration problem.

Further, this reddit account with the very same name contains a nice detailed history of you fudding the project:

https://www.reddit.com/user/henrygeorgist

1.

https://www.reddit.com/r/DashUncensored/comments/f468ne/lying_vulture_ryan_taylors_poverty_exploiting/fj87qbd/?context=3

level 4
henrygeorgist
2 points ·
9 months ago

H.G. Quoting Joel Valenzuela [trdm21]

>"Venezuelan adoption" has replaced "Instamine" as the public's No. 1 reason to hate Dash" End quote

The market hates Dash's *fake news* almost as much as the public does; it's back down to #20.

2.

https://www.reddit.com/r/DashUncensored/comments/f44rnv/is_toxic_sexual_psychopath_macroshits_dashpay/fj86aui/?context=3

>> xkcdmpx
1 point ·
10 months ago

You are a troll and FUDster, you created this account to misrepresent yourself as someone else, this is done to decieve people, you are evil and venomous, please leave this world.
level 3

> henrygeorgist
1 point ·
9 months ago

you are evil and venomous, please leave this world.

You need to calm down.

"Dash is a **scam and was instamined**, you created Dash Force to misrepresent Darkcoin as something else, this is done to decieve people, you are greedy and stupid, please stop **shilling shitcoins**."


3.

https://www.reddit.com/r/DashUncensored/comments/f46b0x/lets_talk_about_dash_in_venezuela_and_why_their/fvs32x7/?context=3

henrygeorgist
2 points ·
6 months ago
· edited 6 months ago

It's not "total FUD" when the fact is Dash can't even buy fried chicken in Venezuala.

The only thing Dash is used for in VZ is to pay for parking at a mall that's been closed down because of the rona.

DCG should have never doubled down on their Fake News about how Ryan The White Savior's instamined altcoin is helping anyone in LATAM.

**That bogus narrative was destroyed by u/georgedonnelly** and the resulting scandal took Dash Force News out. Maybe Joel can ask his new boss at McDonalds to start accepting Dash, LOL.

Notice not only are other prominent members calling this user a infiltrator and a troll (as well as a bad person), but henrygeorgist DEFENDS WELL-KNOWN SCAMMER AND DECEITFUL LIAR GEORGE DONNELLY ON REDDIT JUST LIKE HE DID HERE ON DASHCENTRAL! Which means it is HIGHLY likely that these two individuals are the same person, regardless of whatever bullshit this user responds with.

Here:

" henrygeorgist

3 points,1 month ago

Just wanted to chime in with some words of support and reconciliation.

DeepBlue, I have read and respect your analysis on several projects. You have thoughtful, insightful things to say, and I often agree and resonate with many of them.

GeorgeDonnelly, I respect the work you are doing. It looks like you are actually getting results. Some people are able to manage/organize "ideas" into "reality" and George appears to have special talent here."

>seem like someone that wants to "shut down" the treasury? Shame on you for saying that. And shame on you for promoting fear and tribalism.

No, but someone who calls VZ projects fraudulent (when they've clearly proven to be the best teams we have) definitely would. SHAME ON YOU FOR BEING A CYNICAL LYING ASSHOLE WHO THINKS YOU CAN INFILTRATE OUR COIN AND MANIPULATE US INTO SELF DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR!
Reply
-2 points,1 month ago
I don't use this username on any other platform, so
1. I'm not georgie on youtube.
2. I'm not henrygeorgist on reddit.
3. You're delusional, paranoid, and toxic.

There's a good reason you were banned from reddit. As far as I'm concerned, you don't belong in this forum, either.
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
The one who doesn't belong in this forum here, is YOU infiltrator henrygeorgist.
Now crawl back to your MONERO community and do what you guys do best: sucking each others banana.
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
@henrygeorgist
you little lying piece of dogshit
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
1. Sure you don't.
2. That user wasn't just name georgie, it was originally henry_georgist. You/They changed it when I called you out a year ago. I documented that on reddit too.
3. You're a liar and a piece of shit.

Regardless of whether or not you're the same person as the one on reddit or youtube, I've proven that you here on DC supported George donnelly, just like the idiot on reddit. So even if you're not the same person YOU'RE BOTH EQUALLY FUCKING STUPID.

>There's a good reason you were banned from reddit.

Que? I was never banned from reddit. I was only banned on r/dashpay.

> As far as I'm concerned, you don't belong in this forum, either.

Well you're an infiltrator and a troll and I eat raw, dumb meat like you for breakfast, so I understand why you feel that way.
Reply
2 points,1 month ago
"They do NOT like the fact that we have 71,000 active android wallets in Venezuela per month (2,333 active users per day) in the country with the most cryptocurrency adoption on the planet! *They do NOT LIKE THE FACT* that WE CAN JUST *PRINT* REAL WORLD GROWTH AND ADOPTION EVERY MONTH ON THE NOSE EFFORTLESSLY! While they have to expend a HUGE AMOUNT of energy and capital to generate even a smidgen of attention. I wrote before that there was "no good news" on other subs, and I stand firm in that conviction a month or two later!
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
They do NOT like the fact that we have 71,000 active android wallets in Venezuela per month (2,333 active users per dayLIKE THE FACT) in the country with the most cryptocurrency adoption on the planet! The do NOT that WE CAN PRINT REAL WORLD GROWTH EVERY MONTH ON THE NOSE! While they have to expend a HUGE AMOUNT of energy and capital to generate even a smidgen of attention. I wrote before that there was "no good news" on other subs, and I stand firm in that conviction a month or two later!

BCH "adoption", if you can call it that, in both Venezuela and Antigua are a JOKE! WeNano is supposed to be this "massive adoption success story", but they've only managed to "volunteer donate" roughly $12k USD globally! That might've been impressive in 2014, but Dash puts out **20 FREAKING TIMES** that much money from our treasury EVERY MONTH! They JUST started doing wenano. Yet they have the GALL to claim that they're superior to DASH.

This is called being a SORE LOSER where you CAN'T ADMIT YOU LOST. They think the anonymity of the internet and the fuzziness of the data (Dash's adoption is in mostly non-English-speaking countries) gives them plausiblity to be able to LIE and say they have more adoption than us. Not just BCH and Nano, however, Monero also not only has Ciphertrace OPENLY TRACING transactions for the govt, but THEY'RE ALSO UNDER A MONTH'S LONG ATTACK!

https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/k9d0hu/a_brief_breakdown_of_moneros_ongoing_network/

Someone is running malicious nodes that are deanoning users and causing their transactions to fail and making the network completely unusable for them. Someone posted that they gave up on the coin in frustration after being unable to move their funds! Yet not a PEEP about this ANYWHERE! Nobody cares, the price doesn't fall, they don't have TROLLS like Drako and others talking about firing their core team (which they can't afford to actually have but I digress), and making their coin less useful to capitulate to terrorists, etc. etc.!

Meanwhile, in DASH, we have prominent people making DUMB ARGUMENTS for basically shutting down the treasury, one of our greatest advantages over our competition. Coincidence? Nope. They pretend that this is not what's going to happen. But that is paradoxical because it is THESE SAME PEOPLE who advocate for the defunding and disbanding of DashMallAndParking (our *MOST* performant adoption team TO-DATE!

Imagine being 'pro-Dash' and wanting to FIRE THE GUYS WHO ARE WINNING), DashText (only crypto-sms service IN THE WORLD and its Dash-exclusive; again, just try to imagine what the motivations ((or incentivizations)) of someone claiming to be 'pro-Dash' while also trying to do this could be), DashBrazil (decentralized the MNOs a bit with 26+ in Brazil; for perspective, that's like a constantly running $2.5 million USD DAO in Brazil), DashHelp (Dash exclusive help service; no other coin has this)!

Imagine what could "motivate" someone to make arguments like that while pretending to be 'pro-Dash'. So for me, it is imperative that we nip this problem in the bud. This entire push to 'change the system' has seemed artificial for me. The MNO/Miner resplit made sense, because MNs are taking on more responsibility relative to miners. But both the DCG and MNO plans seem to be "poison-pills" where EITHER OUTCOME WE LOSE! Every subtlety was taken to make sure that at least one of these plans pass, which means that the REAL GOAL was to shut down the treasury by stopping its current function, imo.

The only people who are against the way the treasury currently functions are our enemies. Vote No! so they can't destroy us.
Reply
-1 point,1 month ago
If you have voted NO, please reconsider. This is important.

DCG’s proposed changes would definitely improve the economic incentives of Dash. After Chain Locks were introduced, Dash’s fundamental security spending needs have changed. This proposal now is objectively a major step in the right direction toward optimizing block reward allocations to benefit the entire network’s value going forward. Please realize that there is a logical economic solution to this problem. DCG’s proposal moves us toward a lower and more stable inflation rate in circulating supply, which benefits everyone - including miners. And directly cost-incentivizing treasury spending votes according to the MNO’s portion of expected value gained by the entire network creates a better likelihood of high quality voting. (I believe DCG’s proposal isn’t quite optimal or perfect, but it does capture good value to better align voting incentives and reduce unnecessary security spending, and therefore is certainly worth implementing as soon as possible.)

Some of you are concerned that MNOs will overspend or underspend if this proposal passes. If the goal is to maximize benefit to the whole network, which mostly means maximizing the expected resulting price of Dash, then there should be an optimal treasury spending threshold where positive expected value proposals pass and negative expected value proposals do not pass. Properly aligned incentives are the correct answer. Emotional disagreeing opinions or guesses are not a useful way to decide this.

We have only two choices right now, DCG’s proposal or status quo. The DCG proposal is objectively better and needs to get implemented right away. 2021 will be such an import year for Dash. We need the inflating-circulating-supply issue to be addressed as soon as possible. Please vote yes. (Or convince me otherwise.)

Guys, keep in mind that all of us want the best for Dash; we’re on the same team. Of course we each want to contribute ideas and opinions about what to do and why to do it, and everyone’s thoughts are helpful. But please remain rational and don’t become staunchly married to your ideas. Try to stay open-minded, in search of the true answer, and realize that someone who disagrees with your ideas is also trying to help and improve Dash’s value just like you are.

I want to see Dash in the top 5 next year!
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
No thanks!
Perhaps you are the one who should reconsider and vote no
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
Thank you onetime. This may not pass, but I am happy that we are at least trying to improve the DAO and DCG is leading the charge. When I first heard about this plan I was a little uncomfortable with it, but the more I thought about it the more I liked it. Kudos to RT for coming up with a great idea and working so hard to get the nerd-herd onboard.

If we are stuck with DAO 1.0 it's not a disaster. We can use the DIF to capture excess funds that would normally go to things like MMA fighters if and when Dash goes back to $1,000.
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
Why the rush? There is no penalty for doing nothing, we'll just continue to see the growth and adoption we've seen up until now. So its strange that you're so desperate for this change to take place. Even though you, ostensibly, have no idea whether it will actually be good or not. That's a red flag.

>DCG’s proposed changes would definitely improve the economic incentives of Dash

Are you sure? You haven't proven this. Right now, we have 0 incentives for MNOs to vote No! besides being a bad proposal. If this goes through, then MNOs will have incentivization to vote No! on proposals to increase their share of the blockreward. In other words, the MNOs will go from unbiased, neutral third parties to self-interested ones. That means you're wrong, this would DAMAGE the economic incentives.

Do you not understand that the Dash community among regular users (people who can't afford ASICS or MNs) comes from the treasury? If you do understand this, then you should also easily understand that even without seeing the results, its obvious that incentivizing MNOs to pass FEWER proposals will decrease the amount of adoption we see.

You see, what you're calling 'improving the economic incentives' we who are truly invested in Dash's future call **disincentivizing the treasury**. There have been several outspoken MNOs who have DELIBERATELY STATED over the last two years that they wish to see LESS money spent in the 'third world' on proposals. Which means, that there is a group of MNOs who hold 'beliefs' about the network that are NOT TRUE. Your 'improvement' is based on a FALSE IDEA that there's something wrong with paying people for adoption in the third world. So, by defunding them, to you liars we're 'improving the DAO'.

But in reality, that's just BULLSHIT so you can artificially hamper our growth and slow it down. This isn't irrational. These individuals who own MNs as shown by the MNO tag next to their username have OPENLY STATED that they DO NOT WANT THESE PROPOSALS TO GET FUNDED. SO YOU'RE LYING WHEN YOU SAY WE'RE 'ALL ON THE SAME TEAM'. We are NOT all on the same team. There are those among us who want to DEFUND our proposals, which means YOU'RE AGAINST THE DASH NETWORK. No matter WHAT STUPID BULLSHIT YOU COME UP WITH TO JUSTIFY IT.

Ranking coins by market cap is a SUPERFICIAL AND STUPID WAY to compare coins and judge success. Only trolls seek to get you to behave irrationally by TRICKING YOU with unsound reasoning.
Reply
-3 points,1 month ago
Do you have any idea how hard is is for me to remove waste and fraud from the DAO? Do you have any idea how hard it was to get rid of Kuva, DashCrypto, DashForce, DashLancer, DashDeveloper, DashTaxi and now we have an imaginary retail solution that is going to take months to kill off.

The DAO falls in love with these pet POs and just keeps feeding them until they end up like a six foot alligator that tries to eat the whole DAO or they just take the money and we get nothing back.

Why can't you help make my life easier? Why should I suffer? ;)
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
Of course I do, I'm one of the leading fraud removers in the business. YOU were one of my first successful targets in fact so you should already be aware of my endeavors in this regard. Neither you nor Drako can hold a candle to my efforts to remove waste and fraud because YOU'RE BOTH FRAUDS!

You don't like our proposals? THEN GET THE FUCK OUT!
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-1 point,1 month ago
This is the kind of stuff you want to gaslight us into defunding and removing from our network, things that NO OTHER COIN CAN DO:

The proposal owner has been in direct communication with a Report Team member and hasprovided relevant updates for this month's proposal activity. Significant milestones over the pastmonth were:

• A 4 day Dash campaign promoting Dash at the Church's Chicken in the Sambil Shopping Centerin Caracas;

• A series of training sessions for the staff of the Excelsior Gama supermarket;

• And the release of 4 episodes of the weekly Dash Help Podcast CryptoQUE.

The update included new KPI data. The metrics provided show that Dash Help handled a total of296 support requests across all their supported platforms in November 2020, and their YouTubechannel had 9,343 views over the past month.

The proposal is operating within budget because and has provided expenditure information. DashHelp is reported as behind schedule for one of its three objectives. The proposal is expected to bec ompleted on January 31, 2021

https://reports.dashwatch.org/DEC20/Dash-Help-Nov-Jan-2021.pdf
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-2 points,1 month ago
All other considerations aside, MNOs will most probably benefit from higher rewards in the future with this change. When Dash goes back to 1,000 USD, the budget will probably fall to less than five percent. Most of the other six or seven percent will get distributed back to MNOs.

I frankly don't see a reason to vote this down.
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2 points,1 month ago
Oh please, will you ever stop spinning your deceitful and deceptive narrative!?
You seem to never stop trying to lure MNOs with crumbs, even at the cost of seriously damaging the entire DAO.

We all know where you come from and what your hidden agenda is.
You were more likable long ago, when you openly were a mean troll, a bad actor and agent provocateur,
but we got News for you: Nobody buys into your nice-guy transformation!
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9 points,1 month ago
Voted no. There are too many possible unintended consequences from this. I believe in keeping things simple as possible.
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8 points,1 month ago
Sorry, but i have to vote NO on this!
I think it is too dangerous and a very radical change to the current working of the Dash DAO.
There is substantial risk, that the currently 80% of non-voting masternodes will get "forced" by this,
to get involved with voting, but most likely only for outright rejecting (nearly) every proposal.
I mean, all those non-voting masternodes so far have demonstrated not to bother about any proposal,
and either don't have the time, nerve or inclination to dedicate their time to learn about proposals,
or they believe almost all proposals are a waste.
Cutting into the rewards of such an 80% large group which, frankly, and demonstrably doesn't give a crap
about any proposal, and giving them the power to protect their otherwise higher rewards by just
downvoting them all, will probably get them involved in voting, but only in downvoting.
In my opinion DCG doesn't recognize the extent and magnitude of this danger, and totally underestimates
the greed and selfishness of this 80% large group.

I would have votes yes, if it was designed in such a way:
1) Keep the top 10% of block rewards (from 90%-100% blockreward) reserved for the treasury as it currenty is
(generated and added to inflation, IF approved, but NOT cutting into the rewards of MNOs and miners)
2) Allowing for an excess additional 10% of block rewards (from 80%-90% blockreward),
that would cut into MNO and miner rewards, whereas there would be two possibilities:
a) 40:60 ratio reward decrease for MNO and miners in this secondary 10% budget (80%-90% blockreward bracket)
b) top 10% reserved (90%-100% bracket)
middle 6% affecting only MNO rewards (84%-90% bracket)
bottom 4% affecting only miner rewards (80%-84% bracket)
(actually this would give the miners more predictability, because they would only get affected, whenever masternodes approve to spend 17%, 18%, 19% or even the full 20% of the new budget limit)
At least i believe both options a) and b) would deserve an open and vivid discussion and careful thought,
in order to avoid a potential unwanted impact.

In such a scenario, downvoting just for the sake of maximizing rewards, would only make sense until the
primary reserved 10% of the budget, but would have no reward-gaining effect for a budget not exceeding 10%.
(and still there would be *some* risk, of waking the "sleeping giant" of 80% large MNO group to react by outright downvoting)
Reply
-2 points,1 month ago
Why is the magic number 10%? Did Evan descend from Mt. Sinai with a stone table that said:

"Thy Treasury shall be 10%?"
Reply
3 points,1 month ago
Read again 2)
I was refering to an exceeding additional 10%, as in 10%+10%=20% total possible budget

Just not implemented in such a radical way, that might very well trigger massive downvoting
from a portion of currently non-voting masternodes, which are about 4,000 which is a scary lot!
Reply
-2 points,1 month ago
There is that magic number again. Why do you assume that this percentage has any relevance whatsoever to the actual needs of the DAO?
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6 points,1 month ago
Why don't you directly say, that you endorse the abolition of any budget limit,
by allowing the limit to be the full 100% of block rewards, only then there is no percentage limit.

You always speak about "NEED" of the DAO for funding.
Don't you understand that the miners and MNOs also have the "NEED" for rewards?
Because otherwise they might just shutdown their ASICs or sell their collaterals.

So why don't you tell us, what your "magic number" for the budget limit is ????
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-1 point,1 month ago
I am not talking about the hard limit of 20%, which I find acceptable. I'm talking about your insistence that the first 10% should continue to be "free money." Your plan is complicated. It embraces the new idea without throwing out the old idea! And you just thought of it and are presenting it now after we have been discussing this for over six months?!

The value of Dash varies from month to month and the amount of funds that the DAO can responsibly use in a given month is variable as well. The DCG proposal allows the effective budget percentage to float from cycle to cycle. Incentives are built in such that the higher the budget, the more pain is felt by MNOs, so that the max budget of 20% will probably never be realized.
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2 points,1 month ago
It never was "free money" as you call it. We always had to pay the price in added inflation.
The way our 10% budget worked in the past and ever since, was that it allowed for voting MNOs
to have a more independent and unprejudiced attitude when evaluating all proposals on their
promises, merits and chances of success, without having already made-up their mind.

If this is enacted, what it will accomplish is, that MNOs will get incentivized for voting NO.
And it will greatly skew the YES:NO ratios we are so far used to, to the NO-side.
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-1 point,1 month ago
My point is that when Dash is $1,000 that 10% is probably too much, and when Dash is $50 that 10% is probably too little. This proposal allows the budget's percentage to float from cycle to cycle based upon actual NEED.
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3 points,1 month ago
Right now the budget is generated only to the extent it was previously approved, within a limit of 10%.
Thereafter the limit would be 20%, you speak about "NEED" as if the Sky would be the new limit.

If this proposal is being enacted, what this new implementation of the DAO would actually do,
is making the entire new 20% budget OWNED-BY-DEFAULT by the MNOs and miners,
with the MNOs deciding whether they (and the miners) will renounce to a portion of their
otherwise earned rewards on behalf of some proposal owners who would obtain that portion instead.

You don't have to be a genius to understand, that this could well result in perhaps only half as much
proposals getting approved, maybe even less than that. It will get very difficult to get proposals
approved, perhaps so tough that nobody is willing to risk 5 Dash anymore.

We have not the slightest clue how the currently non-voting 4,000 masternodes would react,
but if only 500 of them begin to downvote every proposal, nothing would get approved then.
This is really playing with fire.

We could as well increase the budget to 20% by extending the blockreward to 110%,
and without cutting into the rewards of miners and masternodes.
This would increase our final Max Supply to some extent, but nothing extraordinary.
And as far as i know, such a solution was never considered or debated.

This envisioned new DAO is essentially making MNOs *pay* directly for every YES-vote.
The result will be great hesitation with YES-votes and fast & easy NO-votes being cast.
Reply
-2 points,1 month ago
You seem rather risk-averse for a crypto HODLER. Which proposals are you fearful might get the axe if this plan is implemented?
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3 points,1 month ago
If just 500 of the 4,000 currently non-voting masternodes begin with generally downvoting all proposals,
then (almost) all proposals will get the axe, including the proposals from DCG.

And this is not an unreasonable expectation, but there is a real danger that this will be the outcome.
You seem to be oblivious to the real risks involved by introducing such a radical change.
Reply
-3 points,1 month ago
Nonsense. Someone who has 100K USD invested in a masternode is not going to decide to torch the DAO just to increase their MN rewards by 10% for a short time.
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
Nonsense. You totally underestimate how many MNOs don't believe in proposals AT ALL.
And of course, most of those are to be found in the 4,000 large group of non-voting masternodes.

Even if the DAO is not completely torched, and DCG&DIF&AndyFreer&MasternodeTool
proposals would still barely get approved, it will no doubt happen that almost all the
other proposals will have almost no chance to get approved, and being deemed
"expendable" by a new majority of voting masternodes.
There may be more money in it for DCG but much less for all other proposal owners,
and probably this was the clandestine goal and the real driving force behind this push.

The question is, whether we really want to go down this path.
Reply
-4 points,1 month ago
Also, you seem to be arguing against the MNO plan, where passed proposals are funded entirely from MNO rewards. You do understand that in this plan any successful proposals are funded by both MNOs and miners 60/40?
Reply
3 points,1 month ago
Tbh, i no longer believe it is a good idea, to cut into miners and MNO rewards,
making MNOs choose who gets some money, they themselves or a proposal owner.

The effect will most likely be, that it will dramatically skew the YES:NO voting ratios
of ALL proposals heavily to the NO-side.
If that is what you intend to do, then you guys may achieve it which this implementation, if this passes.

Personally i am of the belief, that voting YES or NO should have a more balanced effect,
i just don't think its a good idea to economically incentivize MNOs for voting NO.
I mean, i am aware that by doing so, they would also renounce to the potentially positive
effect such a rejected proposal could have had if passed, but the risk is that many MNO
will just think about short-term gains and their own pockets.
Reply
0 points,1 month ago
Do not forget that the main goal of masternode owners is not to lose the value of their collateral, and the task of getting an additional relatively small reward comes only after it.
For example, if DCG funding (and, accordingly, all major software development) is completely suspended, this will deprive the Dash project of predictable prospects and lead to a quick reaction to reduce the value of their masternode collateral.
This is a classic scheme of checks and balances designed to maintain the dynamic equilibrium of the system.
Reply
4 points,1 month ago
You are assuming that the 80% large group of non-voting masternodes is behaving reasonably.
Do they so far behave reasonable, by never making use of their right to vote on such a $100k+ investment ??

In this 80% large group of non-voting masternodes there will probably be many, who don't care
about the DAO and really believe it has little to no benefit. Look at all the projects without a DAO
and without a treasury, they usually get by somehow.
The DAO financed a lot of great and important things for Dash, but many in this group will likely
be completely unaware of this, or simply ignore the benefits of having a DAO when a portion of their
own rewards must be sacrificed.

Look, if this passes, i am not saying that all of those 80% large group of non-voting masternodes will
suddenly start to vote and only to downvote.
It could very well be, for example that 3/4 of this group would continue to never vote,
and 1/8 of this group maybe get seriously involved in voting (like not downvoting everything,
but seriously discerning and voting yes on some proposals as well),
but the remaining 1/8 of this group may very well start to get involved just for downvoting each and
every proposal, in order to maximize their short-term rewards.

Can you guys even imagine, if just 10% of this group, corresponding to about 500 masternodes,
will start to outright downvote almost all proposals ?? No proposal would get passed any longer.
And therein i see the danger. It really is too dangerous.

Btw, are you an MNO?
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
"You are assuming that the 80% large group of non-voting masternodes is behaving reasonably." Yes, and their primitive reasoning is "Dash development is funded anyway and the rest of "promo-attemts" don't have any significant impact on the project yet. It's a pity, but the fact." IMO

"Are you an MNO?" Not yet.
Reply
-3 points,1 month ago
>"Are you an MNO?" Not yet.

Then respectfully, you should NOT be here. This is a place for proposal owners and masternode owners ONLY to discuss our business. It is inappropriate for you to attempt to influence this discussion.
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
That is incorrect, rango can also whitelist people that he thinks can provide a valuable contribution to the discussions. This is not a masternode owners & proposal owners only place. Looks like alex-ru got whitelisted.
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-2 points,1 month ago
It is correct. How else do you suppose we prevent sybil attacks in the comments from those without a stake in the network?

It looks like this is the line you guys are taking to get a 'W', but you can't win this way. The simple fact that such commenters must be 'whitelisted' is enough to prove you're incorrect.

Furthermore, non-proposal and non-MNOs used to be able to comment in the past, that was disabled after the MNOs compained of trolls commenting and trying to influence discussions without a stake in the matter.

So, the fact that such comments must be 'whitelisted' in the first place, plus the fact that there has already been action taken to completely restrict non-whitelisted commenters heavily indicates that YOU ARE INCORRECT and that the MNO's intent (as stated previously on DC) is that non-MNOs and non-proposal-holders not be allowed to comment.
Reply
2 points,1 month ago
This has nothing to do with MNO's intend or with sybil attacks in the comments. Dash Central is rango's site. rango can and does whitelist people so they can participate in the discussions, even if they are not a MNO or a proposal owner.

That is rango's right.
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-2 points,1 month ago
>This has nothing to do with MNO's intend or with sybil attacks in the comments

Citation?

>Dash Central is rango's site.

So? He runs it for a specific purpose. Obviously giving place to shills and trolls isn't that purpose. You really think that just anyone should be allowed to comment here? Really?

>rango can and does whitelist people so they can participate in the discussions

Even assuming that this is in-line with the will of the MNOs, you're moving the goalposts. IT IS TRUE THAT MNOS DO NOT WANT NON-AFFILIATED INDIVIDUALS COMMENTING HERE. Rango was CRITICIZED for this maybe a year or so ago and changed it according to our wishes. So, no, YOU'RE WRONG AND I'M CORRECT: This place is for MNOs and proposal owners to comment ONLY.

>even if they are not a MNO or a proposal owner.

No. You can die on this hill if you wish, but the MNOs disagree.
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
see NEWS

Mar 10, 2018 at 18:15

Participation in budget commenting & voting has been restricted to MNOs, proposal owners and whitelisted users to give more room for focused and constructive discussion.
Reply
1 point,1 month ago
Go complain to rango if you don't like it. But this has been going on for almost three years now.
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-2 points,1 month ago
I'm complaining to you because you're lying. I've got the right person.
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-2 points,1 month ago
As proven by the fact that you have dodged all my questions and moved the goalposts.
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-2 points,1 month ago
Right, which means that I was correct... MNOs directly asked him to do that. But I don't believe they asked him to allow 'whitelisted members'. But thank you for proving I was right in that this place is intended for MNOs and proposal owners to comment.
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1 point,1 month ago
incorrect : restricted to MNOs, proposal owners and whitelisted users
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-1 point,1 month ago
No, you're wrong. **Rango's** decision has NO BEARING on the WILL OF THE MNOs. WE NEVER ASKED FOR A 'WHITELIST', just like we never asked for non-MNOs to be able to comment. Rango did those things on his own. But that doesn't mean that I'm incorrect when I state that the MNOs explicitly wanted MNOs and proposal owners to comment only. As a matter of fact, IIRC when this change occurred, the 'whitelist' itself was the source of considerable controversy.

Regardless, I AM CORRECT. You are trying to win this argument on a technicality that is NOT technically correct. I.e. my argument was that it is inappropriate for non-MNOs and non-proposal owners to comment here as defined by the will and word of the MNOs.

THAT IS CORRECT AND TRUE. Regardless of what Rango thinks. Rango works FOR THE MNOS, *NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND*.
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2 points,1 month ago
I don't think so.
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-2 points,1 month ago
Its not your place to 'think' anything. If you don't have a masternode nor a proposal then you shouldn't comment here. Your opinion of the matter is irrelevant.
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1 point,1 month ago
Respectfully, let's let MNOs decide for themselves whether my or your opinions are useful or not. ;)
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-2 points,1 month ago
No. You are not supposed to be here. The MNOs have *already decided this*. If you don't have a proposal or a MN then, please be silent. You are being disrepectful to the processes of the DAO, whether you write 'respectfully' or not.
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1 point,1 month ago
Where can I see the results of MNO voting on this 'issue"? Thanks.
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-2 points,1 month ago
You may not be aware, but this platform is designed for MNOs and proposal owners to discuss the intracacies of proposals. The point of MN voting is so that we have a sybil resistant way to distribute treasury funds. By commenting here and seeking to influence the discussion while possessing neither a proposal nor MN, you are disrespecting that.
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2 points,1 month ago
I am not aware of any rules and MNO decisions those would prohibit me from participating in discussions here. If you are not lying and they really exist - please confirm this with facts, links, and not your personal speculations. Thanks.
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-2 points,1 month ago
Question, do you believe that anyone should be able to comment here? Monero shills, trolls from other coins, you believe they have a right to be here?
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3 points,1 month ago
I believe here isn't the place for toxic people, regardless of whether they have a masternode. Buying an masternode does not automatically make a person useful, unfortunately. :(
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-3 points,1 month ago
Please, you are discussing this with a MNO, in a forum for MNOs to discuss our business so I request a serious reply to my question. Consider it the same as if you were on the floor of the Senate or something equally important.
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2 points,1 month ago
I rarely comment on the voting, but this time I can't resist, as I observe a high level of FUD and attempts to distort the facts on this proposal.

The most noticible thing is that the proposed change is trying to be interpreted as "this budget proposal is about increasing the budget to 20%." But this is not the case! The real fact is that it is proposing to change the size of the budget from the current "fixed 10%" to "dynamic 0-20%". And that's a completely different story.

Don't forget that now 80% of masternodes never vote at all. The point is basically (IMHO) that they don't see any influence from the voting results on their wallets. If the proposed changes to the budgeting system are adopted, every single one of them will see the consequences of voting - every month. And not abstract consequences, but direct changes of balance of their wallets. And this is a completely different situation and a strong incentive to start voting.

And the danger of change is not (IMHO) that "stupid masternodes start spending the maximum 20% of the emission", but that all masternodes that were silent before will enter the wallet and vote "NO" everywhere, even without reading the budget proposal's descriptions.

I guess that after the initial shake-up for most of the months we will not see not only 20%, but even the former border of 10% will hardly be crossed often. Simply because now the Maternodes will have to sponsor all these "Good but Ineffective Dash Teams" at the expense of their own money. And many will refuse to continue doing this on today's "communist principles." Most likely only those which has a real chance to return more for the network than spent on them will finally be financed.

This is simple a efficiency. And Dash needs efficiency to compete with the alternatives. I am in favor of efficiency and for this change.

Those who vote "NO" - please ask yourself: Do I really understand the mechanism of the proposed change? Didn't I fall under the influence of other people's interpretations and grievances? Does the proposed new mechanism really seem to me less efficient than the one that works now?
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1 point,1 month ago
I really hope people can see how impprtant this proposal is for our future and support it. Thank you for sharing your thoughts is great to see you are still active with the community.
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4 points,1 month ago
MNO should be aware of the phycological principal which is called "Social Proof" . This principal influences people to make decisions in line with the majority. e.g. if there are a lot of votes already for one action, the people are likely to feel influenced to vote in line with the majority even if they feel it is not the right thing to do. You can read more about this principal here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_proof

So what is the antidote to social proof ? The answer is awareness.

Here is a hypothetical example of social proof in action. Let's just say one group of individuals in Dash has a vested interest in this proposal passing proposal and they also just happened to have a very large number of masternodes - lets say 410 masternodes. Now lets say this group wanted to influence other MNOs to vote in line with what they wanted, so that they could benefit from the increase in the budget. If they wanted to use social proof to influence you they would cast their votes early on so it would appear that the majority of MNOs were voting in favour of the proposal. This is where social proof would have its effect. MNOs who normally would not want to vote for an increase in the budget would feel a pressure to vote in line with the majority voters - through the power of social proof.

The power of social proof is so strong that people have actually died due to its power. Psychologist Robert Cialdini, who, co-incidentally is at Arizona State University, wrote in his seminal book entitled "Influence science and practice" gave the example of a situation were people in a restaurant burned to death even though the exit door was wide open and anyone could have left the room at any time. However nobody left and everyone burned to their deaths. Why? Because everyone was looking at everyone else and since nobody left the room everyone died. That is how powerful social proof is!

So, MNOs, remember the antidote to social proof manipulation is awareness when this principal is in play. Oh, and next time you're in a burning restaurant don't look at what everyone else is doing. Just do the sensible thing. Think for yourself and do the sensible thing!
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0 points,1 month ago
I don't have a strong opinion either way on this particular proposal, but I very much like that you draw attention to this "Social Proof" phenomenon (loved Prof Cialdini's book "Influence")

You say:
> the antidote to social proof manipulation is awareness when this principal is in play

Yes awareness can help, but... It is *always* in play. *All* voters are *always* influenced by *any* prior voters. We can only wish that everyone would always be aware of it (but alas humans are such fallible creatures).

Instead, we should plan and design the system in a way that minimizes the fallible aspects of their nature. The ideas in James Surowiecki's "The Wisdom of Crowds" suggest we hide all votes during the voting period, until voting deadline is passed, and then reveal them.

"Wisdom of crowds" works best when you have a large number of independent voters

I encourage everyone to consider this:
https://www.reddit.com/r/dashpay/comments/dp9mz6/wisdom_of_crowds_how_to_get_better_voting_results/

It may very well result in better overall proposal decisions and better usage of treasury funds.
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-2 points,1 month ago
I've heard of masternode blinding, but this is the first I hear of masternode owner blinding. I don't think concealing information from voters is helpful in any way. Voters should have as much information as possible up until the last block of the cycle, and that includes which proposals are passing, which proposals are failing, which proposals are being engaged, and which proposals are being ignored.
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0 points,1 month ago
> which proposals are being ignored.

You could announce/record that a vote was made on a proposal, but not in which direction. That would resolve the problem of an ignored proposal.

> Voters should have as much information as possible

Voters should have as much *relevant* information as possible. How another entity has voted at which time is not only irrelevant to the merits of a proposal, but is detrimental. It is like the person that happens to sit in the first row of the audience who is asked first what he believes is correct, and everyone else in the audience hears his response before making their vote. The accident of who sits in the right location **greatly** influenced all other answers (often wrongly), just as the accident of who voted first and how they vote greatly influenced all other votes (often poorly).
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-2 points,1 month ago
What about the wisdom of the crowd? There was a gameshow called, "Who Wants To Be A Millionaire?" where contestants could poll the studio audience for help in answering a question. Guess what...

http://www.freestak.com/blogposts/who-wants-to-ask-the-audience-the-benefits-and-pitfalls-of-social-media/

"After 15 years of the show, the 'ask the audience' success rate is between 91% and 92%, compared to a 66% success rate for the 'phone a friend' lifeline where the contestant can phone someone they know for advice."
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1 point,1 month ago
I don't understand this comment. You are arguing FOR wisdom of crowds with your example (poll the audience gives better success than phone a friend). Yet you argue AGAINST it above.

For a comparable analogy to "public voting" is... on that game show, they would ask each individual to announce his vote before going to the next, i.e. the first person in the first row would say what he believes, then the second, etc. And go through the whole audience one by one, each hearing what the person before had "guessed" (this example is given in James Surowiecki's book "The Wisdom of Crowds"). What happens is that the first few responses inordinately influence ALL OTHER guesses and you get a very bad result.

In order for the response to benefit from the wisdom of crowds, all responses must be given independently without influence from knowing how anyone else has voted.
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3 points,1 month ago
@geert the wisdom of crowds is exactly what I'm advocating. However there is no wisdom of crowds if DCG vote with their several hundred masternodes votes right at the beginning of their proposals because of fake social proof. We had 400+ votes that all appeared in one go right at the beginning of this proposal. That is the very opposite of wisdom of crowds when a very small group of people voting with large numbers of Masternodes. This is manipulation of the votes through using Social Proof principal that I spoke about.

Your own argument therefore nullifies itself. The wisdom of crowds only occurs when the actual crowd is not influenced by the FAKE social proof that DCG is creating by using their own MN votes on their own proposals.

I can't help but think where did the money come from for those hundreds of DCG masternodes? The more money DCG make the more individual MNOs will lose decentralized control of the treasury because the more masternodes the more voting power they will have. Bearing in mind that under most circumstances we only have about 600 to 800 MNO votes on a project and 400+ votes seem to be coming from a very small group of people who all vote at the same time for DCG projects.



Dash is systematically becoming centralised step by step. We have to stop this. These are the reasons why Dash is becoming centralized:

1. DCG vote for their own proposals with a large number of masternodes.

2. Ryan often will not answer questions about spending in the DCG proposals e.g. the DCG office space which has been shown to be completely empty on every time a trusted member of DASH has undertake spot checks on their office. Not once was any of DCG staff in that office at ASU complex. 55k for office space that is mostly empty. Ryan has not responded to my requests for feedback on this. Doesn't exactly garner trust Ryan when you remain silent. Doesn't look good at all on you Ryan and honestly it reduces my trust and confidence in Ryan Taylor by the lack of response.

3. Ryan Taylor has said several times he wants MNOs to "trust" e.g. he stated that we should trust the DIF and put forward his suggestions to the network that the MNOs do not need to approve their funding through a vote. We must be able to vote on funding from the DIF and we need to see the full financial investment agreement to do that. The DIF, which now also includes Ryan Taylor, does not want to agree to full transparency on the NDA. My view is if an organization wants an NDA on the financial agreement they are not right for being funded by a decentralized organization because we need to have transparency in the agreements and we need to see the full terms of those agreements.

4. The Dash Trust Protectors meetings are kept private. We don't know what goes on in those meetings. Why not?

5. DCG put Dash code into closed source for over a year and during that time did not answer my requests for information in their funding proposals which I repeatedly asked. We all now know why that was now. It was not to give Dash first mover advantage - it was because the code was not developed as it was supposed to be.

5. Ryan Taylor comes from a background of traditional finance. I'm sorry, but I inherently have a healthy level of skepticism from anyone coming from the traditional financial system and entering the Dash project. Ryan reached out to Evan Duffield and not the other way around.

6. I have spoken with DashWatch members in depth about circumstances regarding Alt36 and DCG claims on that project. I am not going to reveal all the details that I learned here because I don't think it is appropriate however I was disturbed by what I learned from speaking with DashWatch.

7. DCG do not want DashWatch reports on their project. I've spoken with DashWatch about this personally. There are excuses like it would take too much time or money or we have to trust them on their quarterly reports. Every other Dash project is subject to a DW report as an independent audit but DCG will not agree to do it.

8. Ryan is now also working on the DIF as well as on DCG CEO. I would not mind this so much provided we have full transparency on the actual financial agreement for funding - however we don't have this. My view is funding from a decentralized organization needs to be 100% transparent when it comes to the terms of the agreement. NDA's can be used for IP knowledge but not on the financial investment agreement.

9. If DCG are to continue to vote on their own proposal we should at least know how many MNs are they voting with exactly so that we can make a more informed decision how fake social proof is acting on these proposals.

Stage by stage, bit by bit we are losing decentralized control to DCG through Ryan Taylor's leadership. If this continues and the number of Masternodes that DCG holds increases we will lose decentralized control of the Dash Project. This is also likely to happen if this proposal passes because DCG will have access to even greater amounts of funds.

How would I feel OK with the budget increasing to 20? The following would have to happen as a minimum:

a) DCG agree to have quarterly DashWatch reports on their project.
b) We have procedures in place for MNOs to have the information they need in order to make quality decisions on projects. I have suggested a few ways this can be done on the Dash Forum.
c) The DIF have fully transparent investment agreements to the network. No NDAs obscuring financial agreements with the network. NDAs can be used on protecting knowledge on IP only but not on the financial agreement itself.

d) Spending by DCG is in question as far as I am concerned until the DCG is systematically independently audited both financially and on their project by DashWatch. In the past DCG wanted to spend 1 million dollars on google Ads. This shows that as the budget increase the spends increase and often without proper thought about how those funds are to be spent. 1 million dollars on google ads was absolutely crazy. Luckily circumstances changed so they could not spend this.

The $200,000 - $250,000 dollars per month going to DCG is more than enough. They have to learn to use this money more wisely. This is more than most other crypto projects are getting and even with this we still have not delivered Evolution on time.

I feel MNOs need to fight to ensure that the Dash project remains decentralized and that we do not have to rely on trust at all.
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7 points,1 month ago
I believe some of you are getting hung up on the percentages per se, when in reality this would be a healthy change in the game theory system where approving a proposal would mean less money in an MNO's pocket with only that we should see a shift in spending only in more valuable proposals not really getting to the higher limits of the treasury allocation. I believe this is an improvement over the current system and thus I will be supporting this proposal.
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0 points,1 month ago
It's mediocre at best compared to the MNO plan, where were you last cycle? Did you vote for the MNO plan?
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0 points,1 month ago
They are so similar though, is actually the same net effect. Step 1. Keep important proposals that add value. Step 2. Vote against unnecessary proposals. Step 3. Save money. Is a no brainer in my opinion. People against it seem to be either trying to make it a political issue, hung up on the percentage while ignoring the game theory or underestimating MNOs while acknowledging they would vote more conciously themselves.
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-2 points,1 month ago
I could not have said this better myself. Thank you!
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-1 point,1 month ago
I see the whale vote is already making up our minds.
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1 point,1 month ago
Note to whales: You may want to let the rest of the network discuss matters before you put your thumb on the scales. Again.
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0 points,1 month ago
Why should it be that any vote influences another? Shouldn't a proposal be decided based on its own merits? And not on how others happened to vote on it? (Nor when they voted?)

Would the system work better if votes are hidden until the voting deadline?

https://www.reddit.com/r/dashpay/comments/dp9mz6/wisdom_of_crowds_how_to_get_better_voting_results/
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-2 points,1 month ago
Whales have the most to gain AND the most to lose. You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means ;)

IIR, you are not a MNO. You were given a voting key by one of the DashForce mobsters in lieu of payment for your loyal service. They really were cheapskates!
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0 points,1 month ago
But Dash Force did teach me the Double Secret Dash Force Mafia Handshake, that is all that I have left from my days under their employ.
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1 point,1 month ago
DF never gave me a voting key, I was a part time employee. I was approached by an MNO(s?) and have been delegating since the option became available on the network.
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3 points,1 month ago
Definite no. The reason I'm voting no on this proposal is because I do not believe there are sufficient safeguards to ensure the DAO can make good enough quality decisions on proposals. Without first making substantial improvements on how the DAO makes investment decisions I do not have confidence that the increased funding band would be wisely used.

Ryan Taylor in his post below states that we should not use past events to determine our decisions going forward because we have "evolved". I disagree with this statement on many levels. Firstly MNOs are coming in and out of the project all the time therefore past knowledge and experience does not necessarily stay with the governance system. In addition we have not improved the governance system in order for us to evolve and to retain that past knowledge and experience. In order to make good quality decisions MNOs need better quality information about the projects requesting funding. MNOs cannot make sound decisions without this essential project information. We also need to retain our past experiences and document them so that new MNOs entering the ecosystem can benefit from our past learnings.

If the DAO implemented procedures to ensure that MNOs could make better quality decisions by being in receipt of better quality information then I would consider a budget increase because I could have confidence the money would be well spent. However right now I am not at all confident that the increased budget allowance would be well spent because we simply do not have the detailed information necessary to make those decisions. MNOs in general also do not have much time and they do not spend much time assessing proposal. We can see this by the lack of assessing questioning in the proposals. Often MNOs post a brief comment and that is about it when it comes to their assessments. MNOs typically do not grill the proposal owners on the details and as a result they are not making quality decisions.

I have made some posts on the Dash forum detailing actual steps we can take to improve the quality of decisions made by the DAO. I feel these steps are absolutely essential in order for MNOs to get quality information on a project in order to make quality decisions.

Here are links to these posts:

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/06-decentralized-decision-making-why-business-plans-need-to-be-submitted-before-funding.51049/

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/07-decentralized-decision-making-vetting-proposal-owners-before-they-get-funding.51050/

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/08-decentralized-decision-making-improved-self-reporting-of-project-progress.51051/

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/01-decentralised-decision-making-steps-to-a-better-solution.50309/

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/02-decentralised-decision-making-what-are-dashs-core-values.50310/

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/03-decentralised-decision-making-what-are-dashs-target-markets.50371/

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/04-decentralised-decision-making-the-dash-decentralisation-charter-ddc.50379/#post-224477

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/05-decentralised-decision-making-the-dash-masternodes-association.50390/#post-224478


The above steps will help to weed out low quality proposals and help to eliminate money-grabbers. The improvements I suggested would also ensure that MNOs have a lot more information on a project with which to make a better assessment if the project is worthwhile. I also showed how we could leverage our past learnings and experience so that new MNOs could benefit from what we have learned from the past. Without these steps (or something similar) being in place I will not have confidence in expanding the budget up to 20% because I don’t believe it would be well spent and if anything could cause greater damage to the network through the wasting of money and the loss of our reputation in making quality decisions.
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-5 points,1 month ago
The best way to address your concerns is to prevent ENTREPRENEURIAL STARTUPS from accessing funds direct from the treasury system, where oversight is lacking, and instead fund them (if it makes sense) through the DASH INVESTMENT FOUNDATION.

But you're not really a fan of the DIF.
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2 points,1 month ago
@geert once again you've twisted my view again. Getting to be a habit now. I'm beginning to wonder what your agenda is.

Let me be clear. I've voted for the DIF in past proposals. I made it very clear why I have stopped voting for the DIF in their last proposal. I want the DIF to be completely transparent regarding the terms of any deals they are setting up with any company. Currently they are not disclosing the full terms of the investment agreement which they say is due to an NDA. I'm saying that no NDA should exist for the investment with a decentralized organization.

Let me again be crystal clear. If the DIF can ensure all terms of the investment contracts are transparent to the network I would vote for the DIF again.
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-2 points,1 month ago
https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/06-decentralized-decision-making-why-business-plans-need-to-be-submitted-before-funding.51049/
https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/07-decentralized-decision-making-vetting-proposal-owners-before-they-get-funding.51050/
https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/08-decentralized-decision-making-improved-self-reporting-of-project-progress.51051/
https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/01-decentralised-decision-making-steps-to-a-better-solution.50309/
https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/02-decentralised-decision-making-what-are-dashs-core-values.50310/
https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/03-decentralised-decision-making-what-are-dashs-target-markets.50371/
https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/04-decentralised-decision-making-the-dash-decentralisation-charter-ddc.50379/#post-224477
https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/05-decentralised-decision-making-the-dash-masternodes-association.50390/#post-224478

We don't have time to stop everything and remake the DAO according to your demands and with you ostensibly in charge of everything.
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3 points,1 month ago
Yeah, and I don't have time to waste responding to you going forward.
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-6 points,1 month ago
Why have you not demanded a business plan from Dash Retail, a project you wholeheartedly support?
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1 point,1 month ago
I impartially shared my experience of working with Ash at Dash Retail in his proposal. I don't know what your motivation is for deliberately and consistently twisting what I've written? Presumably you have a hidden agenda.

Regarding business plans. Why are YOU not requesting business plans from proposal owners? I have been requesting them of many proposal owners but without it becoming mandatory proposal owners are going to keep avoiding doing them.
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-1 point,1 month ago
I'm simply drawing attention to your hypocrisy. You demand this and you demand that --except not for your pet PO?
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1 point,1 month ago
Whatever. Clearly you are not open to rational argument and you have your view which cannot be reasoned with. No amount of discussion will do with characters such as yourself.

It seems that others think the same with all the down votes your are collecting. It's people like you that need to leave Dash because you don't contribute anything positive - just a disruptive comments.

I welcome discussing with anyone who has an opposing view provided it is in a healthy manner. However discourse with you is not healthy. It is not healthy here or in any discussion we have had previously. Your remit is to discredit everything I write. Not once any positive contribution. Clearly you have an agenda to disrupt in a negative way anyone that has a positive contribution to make. I don't have time for people such as yourself.
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5 points,1 month ago
I hope we can stay civil in these discussions and I think this passing or not will not deeply hurt the project either way. Evan originally proposed 20%, I on the other hand thought 10% to be better at the time. I'm not sure if it was me or a combination of people who convinced Evan to go with 10% but fast forward 4 years or so later and I do not know what the right number really is. While I think we were right to go with 10% before its possible that increasing to 20% might create some kind of momentum as more projects could potentially get funded. I do not particularly like the incentive to reduce treasury spending that accompanies this proposal while I know many others do. I most likely would have voted yes on a flat out increase to 20%, and I would have also voted yes if under 10% we kept the system as is. As the proposal currently stands I'm tepidly abstaining for now.
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0 points,1 month ago
"It doesn't make sense to hire smart people and tell them what to do; we hire smart people so they can tell us what to do." -- Steve Jobs

RT had this figured out in June and here we are six months later still agonizing over it. This plan is not THAT different from the MNO plan, so you would think the proponents of the MNO plan would choose this one over the current system. Right?

I am going to try to stay civil. Thank you for that advice.
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2 points,1 month ago
Steve Jobs was also kicked out of his own business by the board of directors and the CEO. Steve Jobs regretted trusting the "smart people" you are referring to.

Here is what Steve Jobs actually said about one of those "smart people" he trusted:

https://youtu.be/IuMyBAvRjL0?t=223
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0 points,1 month ago
My point is that it's perfectly appropriate for RT to be presenting the DAO with these decision proposals so we can benefit from experience and improve our operations. He works for us and that's his job. No one should be threatened by that.

What is your point?
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2 points,1 month ago
My point is clear. Build a system that does not rely on trust alone... unless you want to get reckt.
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1 point,1 month ago
You know - when you write the text of a proposal, you are supposed to be selling it. The person reading is meant to get drawn in. I have read the first two paragraphs of this and I still don't know what is actually being proposed. I'm just not excited. (I expect some people won't like this comment - but really - know your audience)
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7 points,1 month ago
Without the fiscal responsibility that would come with the MNO plan (all treasury funds taken from MNO pay, not miner pay) I cannot support this proposal. As it stands this proposal would lead to more frivolous spending of other people's money on low value initiatives.

No votes coming in 2 days time.
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2 points,1 month ago
This will introduce incentives for reducing treasury spending. The current system has no direct incentive at all to control spending.
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-5 points,1 month ago
This is the FIRST TIME we are considering spending other people's money on successful proposals, so you cannot criticize this plan by saying it will lead to more. It's going from zero so OF COURSE it will be more.

The MNO plan is dead. I hope we don't hear any more butthurt about that here.
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2 points,1 month ago
Voting no, raising the treasury over 10% is a bad idea. Already the money is mostly wasted and devalues dash. Look at dash always around 30th place.
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-4 points,1 month ago
FUD. This plan will likely result in less waste.

Pointing to Dash's place on CMC and saying it's because X is a fallacy. Dash's lower place on CMC is a direct result of the intense competition we face that was not there two years ago. There are many compelling crypto projects at this point vying for mindshare and investor dollars.
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7 points,1 month ago
I will have to vote NO on increasing the budget from its current 10% of the blockrewards, to max 20% of the blockrewards. I think the risks outweigh the benefits of such an increase. The risks i see are as follows :

* This proposed change could have unforeseen side-effects on the voting behavior of masternode operators. Masternode operators who are mainly interested in their masternode ROI, could end up either carelessly downvoting a lot of budget proposals or they could stop voting on budget proposals altogether, just to avoid receiving a cutback (-6%) on their masternode rewards. Or masternode operators could end up carelessly upvoting a lot of budget proposals, just to bring the miner rewards to its lowest reward percentage. Not to mention that we have entities out there that have a large number of masternodes under their control, this change will give them unprecedented influence over both masternode blockrewards and miner blockrewards.

* This proposed change has the risk of increasing the Dash sell pressure on the open market, whenever the budget allocation extends from its current 10% of the blockrewards to the max 20%. That additional 10% of the blockrewards comes mostly from masternodes (-6%) and from miners (-4%) and will flow directly to budget proposal owners, who are far more likely to sell that additional Dash to FIAT straight away. Thus creating that additional Dash sell pressure on the open market.

* This proposed change has the risk of directly undermining our effort to strenghten Dash Store of Value, which is focused on making masternodes more interesting and attractive to investors, so our Dash supply gets more bought up on the open market and we start to flatten the curve, with regards to our still growing Dash supply and our still high Dash supply inflation over the next number of years. The -6% cut on masternode rewards undermines that effort, each time the budget allocation extends to 20%.

I like Dash current blockreward allocation of 54% masternodes / 36% miners / 10% budget, where the blockrewards are crystal clear to both miners, masternodes and is not in any way influenced by how much the budget is allocated each month. It does not introduce an element of uncertainty about the exspected ROI each month for masternodes and miners either.

Also i would like to point out that a number of 'good value proposals' that requested Dash funding in the past, still failed in the end. ALT36 is such a budget proposal that comes to mind. When we have project partners who can make or break a project (ALT36 situation), or when we have increased regulation on 'privacy coins', possibly causing future 'good value proposals' to fail as well, then why should we connect our Dash masternode blockreward percentage to that ?

I think it is better to keep the masternode blockreward percentage and the Dash budget blockreward percentage separate from each other, they should not be intertwined like this. With the proposed change, it feels to me like a part of the masternode blockrewards (-6%) will effectively be used as a means to gamble on the possible success of a budget proposal. Looking at the number of budget proposals that failed already, i don't like the odds.
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1 point,1 month ago
Let me address some of the risks you outline (numbering added to help facilitate any following discussion):
1) Risk that MNOs vote everything down and stifle the project - Many MNOs I speak with are concerned that other MNOs might act in this manner. I've yet to speak to even one MNO that plans to vote everything down. The overwhelming evidence - therefore - is that this fear is largely unwarranted. MNOs tend to have become MNOs in the first place because they believe in Dash's governance and self-funding capabilities, and that the treasury exists because it creates value.
2) Risk of increased sell pressure - This risk would only manifest itself if the MNOs allocated funding toward activities that cost more than the value they bring to the network. MNOs, like all humans, are certainly flawed and subject to making mistakes, but they are incentivized not to behave in a wasteful manner under this proposal. In fact, they are incentivized to restrict spending for the first time. While this requires trust that your fellow MNOs will act rationally, that is trust you have already placed in your fellow MNOs by becoming an MNO yourself.
3) Store of Value risk - As stated, the risks you present is only partially true (and is in some ways a repeating of risk #2). Even if the FULL 20% maximum amount were approved, MNOs would still receive 48% of the block reward (compared to 45% before the Store of Value work was introduced). This means that the full impact of the SoV reallocation would not occur, but it would nonetheless still have a positive (though admittedly smaller) impact. So even in a worst-case scenario, this change could not fully offset the effects of the reallocation.

In general, I would encourage my fellow MNOs to not simply point to past issues and events and draw a line toward inevitable failure of our future spending. We have learned as a community. Behavior has changed as the network matures, and we encounter new scenarios from which we learn. We have new tools like the DIF to ensure larger grants can benefit the network with equity to account for the risk of a particular venture. In short, we should not lose our appetite for risk and innovation... we should instead create the incentives for intelligent and balanced risk taking.
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-4 points,1 month ago
When Dash goes back to $1,000, and it will, I do not want the DAO tempted to fund ridiculous things like MMA fighters just because there is room in the budget. I think that alone is reason enough to move forward with this.
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6 points,1 month ago
when Dash is in a bear market (as it is today), I do not want to have a certain entity with a lot of masternodes under its control, have influence on budget proposals like the DIF (which is about setting aside reserves for investments with a larger risk factor), at the expense of masternode rewards.
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-1 point,1 month ago
"I do not want to have a certain entity with a lot of masternodes under its control"

I was reviewing your comments and this one struck me. What are you saying here? What entity?
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1 point,1 month ago
That's a fair point. No one knows exactly how this will play out. Based upon the results of the last cycle, I am not worried about DIF funding. The DAO seems to have finally accepted the DIF as an essential part of itself.

This proposal gives the DAO more power. I think we're ready to wield that power.
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0 points,1 month ago
I think if this decision proposal passes, the DIF could be its first casuality. Masternode operators could be far less motivated to vote on the DIF, if that means getting cut -6% on their masternode rewards.

I know it will negatively change my voting behavior towards the DIF. I am simply not prepared to let the budget extend from 10% to anything further at the expense of my masternode rewards, just so the DIF can build up its reserves for future investments with a larger risk factor.
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1 point,1 month ago
Are you serious? Take for example: the DIF proposes 500 Dash/month. The masternodes would pay for 60% which is 300 Dash. Divided by 5000 masternodes, each masternode would be paying 0.06 Dash. You would be willing to defund a DIF proposal because you want an extra 0.06 Dash for the month for each masternode you have? It not even a drop in the bucket compared to the 4.7 Dash each masternode is already currently earning. That is why I any many others felt that this proposal doesn't go far enough to incentivize fiscal restraint.
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0 points,1 month ago
I am very serious, and this is also what i ment with the risk of having unintentional side-effects on voting behavior, specially with those masternode operators that do not want to see the budget extend beyond its 10%.
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1 point,1 month ago
I'm getting mixed messages from this - you want to make sure the budget stays tight (oppose increasing the max from 10% to 20%), but you also want to make sure the budget stays loose (oppose the MN-incentive to vote for value-proposals). Can you explain your position more clearly?
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1 point,1 month ago
First and foremost i am against extending the budget to anything beyond 10%. That position of mine does not change if this decision proposal passes, it will just mean i will be forced to vote a lot more strategic on proposals, in an effort to keep the budget as close to 10% as possible.

As Ryan mentioned, this decision proposal will introduce incentives for reducing treasury spending, the DIF as a budget proposal will not form an exception to that. I think because of its high risk nature, it could even stand out (make an easier target) when compared to other budget proposals.

It could be something as simple as DCG raising some of their monthly re-occurring budget proposal amounts, in combination with a multi-month DIF proposal hitting the network that could cause the budget to extend beyond its 10% for many months. I would most likely still support DCG (depending on how much they raise their budget amount), but i would stop supporting the DIF in such a situation. Not only because of the DIF high risk nature, but also in an effort to keep the budget at 10%.
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-4 points,1 month ago
Please qwizzie, I don't expect FUD from you of all people. Are you saying that you personally are too greedy to fund the DIF?!

The DIF is crucial if we are ever to stop the plague of "entrepreneurs" who are constantly creating proposals where they talk about how much they LURVE Dash and want to help us gain adoption if only we give them free money with no strings attached so they can build their own brand.

All entrepreneurs must be told, "Talk to the DIF."
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0 points,1 month ago
I am saying that i am willing to support the DIF if there is allocation space in the 10% budget for it, but i will not support the DIF when its proposal is the reason the budget is extending from 10% to 20%. I am already against expending of the budget beyond its current 10%, i am double against it if the expending is due to the DIF and its buildup of reserves for high risk investments.
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0 points,1 month ago
So far we've been able to fund the DIF just fine with a budget of under 10%. If this plan is implemented, I expect the budget to remain about 10% or maybe even a bit less given Dash's current value.
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-5 points,1 month ago
We have a group of mediocrities here who imagine that since they were smart enough to buy a masternode, they're somehow smart enough to assume a leadership role in the DAO. These people envy DCG's influence, and so they have a kind of fantasy that if they can prevent DCG from doing something, this is somehow a demonstration of "leadership" on their part.

These envious mediocrities would prevent us from innovating -- whether it's with the DIF or this proposal, for example, just to satisfy their own selfish, emotional needs.

IF you don't want Dash to innovate, please sell your masternode and buy Bitcoin. The symbol is BTC.
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