Proposal “LeftoverTreasuryFunds“ (Closed)Back
| Title: | Decision Proposal: Grant all leftover treasury funds to masternodes at the end of each cycle. |
| Owner: | forro68 |
| One-time payment: | 1 DASH (30 USD) |
| Completed payments: | no payments occurred yet (1 month remaining) |
| Payment start/end: | 2023-08-11 / 2023-09-10 (added on 2023-08-08) |
| Final voting deadline: | in passed |
| Votes: | 66 Yes / 340 No / 62 Abstain |
Proposal description
This proposal intends to change the Masternode Operator's perception of treasury funds from 'free money' to that of 'coming out of my pocket', encouraging passive MNOs to participate in voting on and discussing proposals.
Currently and historically, it appears that treasury funds have been spent with the participation of a small minority of MNOs and with little discussion, scrutiny, oversight, or followup, resulting in poor results. It seems this status quo has failed the project.
With the proposed change, MNOs would see that if they participate in voting No on poorly crafted or likely ineffective proposals, or against proposal owners with a history of not producing results, the MNOs have a chance to increase their income for the cycle, and so would come to the table, joining the active Dash community in discussing proposals, their likely effectiveness, and later, their results.
With the the newly active MNOs present, proposals would need to pass a higher bar. Soon, proposals would be crafted with higher quality and likely have better results. More MNOs would continue to monitor the outcome of each proposal to determine if the PO has been effective, and if they are worth funding again in the future.
A common fear of the proposed change is that MNOs would vote No across the board in a short-sighted money grab. As has been discussed, that is a very unlikely outcome, as they are major stakeholders in the project and want to see Dash rise in fiat value, ranking, activity, and adoption.
Likely positive effects:
- Increased voting participation.
- Increased discussion participation.
- Increased proposal followup.
- An increase in votes.
- Better, more effective proposals.
- New ideas brought to the community for transparency, accountability, and adoption.
- Newly engaged MNOs would become advocates and champions of using dash in daily life.
- A higher ROI due to the monthly 'bonus' for stricter spending.
- A higher masternode count due to the slightly higher ROI.
- A rise in the rankings due to greater dash scarcity
- A rise in the rankings due to more effective proposals igniting more adoption.
Likely negative effects:
-An increase in No votes for poorly crafted proposals
Keep in mind those who are funded by the treasury will come out against this change, using FUD and other tactics to see it fail, to their benefit. They are quite happy with the status quo. It wouldn't surprise me if they submitted or popularized a competing, inferior proposal as Ryan and Rion did last time around, in order to distract or dilute from this one. Don't let them sway you from the simple, clear logic which this proposal presents. Also beware attacks from their faithful defenders.
Similarly, there are likely a few MNOs who enjoy their outsized influence on what passes and what doesn't because of a lack of greater MNO participation. Don't let one or two participating whales convince you by their no votes that there is some sort of unspoken consensus. Support this proposal and watch the MNOs come, and the community be reborn from it's slow death of apathy and stagnation.
This is a simple proposal, causing a simple yet effective shift in perspective, and is simple to code.
If approved, the change would be required to be included in the next minor release, ie 19.4.
See here for previous discussions on the same subject:
https://www.reddit.com/user/forro68/submitted/
Thank you for your support. I look forward to new life being breathed into the community and the project.
Currently and historically, it appears that treasury funds have been spent with the participation of a small minority of MNOs and with little discussion, scrutiny, oversight, or followup, resulting in poor results. It seems this status quo has failed the project.
With the proposed change, MNOs would see that if they participate in voting No on poorly crafted or likely ineffective proposals, or against proposal owners with a history of not producing results, the MNOs have a chance to increase their income for the cycle, and so would come to the table, joining the active Dash community in discussing proposals, their likely effectiveness, and later, their results.
With the the newly active MNOs present, proposals would need to pass a higher bar. Soon, proposals would be crafted with higher quality and likely have better results. More MNOs would continue to monitor the outcome of each proposal to determine if the PO has been effective, and if they are worth funding again in the future.
A common fear of the proposed change is that MNOs would vote No across the board in a short-sighted money grab. As has been discussed, that is a very unlikely outcome, as they are major stakeholders in the project and want to see Dash rise in fiat value, ranking, activity, and adoption.
Likely positive effects:
- Increased voting participation.
- Increased discussion participation.
- Increased proposal followup.
- An increase in votes.
- Better, more effective proposals.
- New ideas brought to the community for transparency, accountability, and adoption.
- Newly engaged MNOs would become advocates and champions of using dash in daily life.
- A higher ROI due to the monthly 'bonus' for stricter spending.
- A higher masternode count due to the slightly higher ROI.
- A rise in the rankings due to greater dash scarcity
- A rise in the rankings due to more effective proposals igniting more adoption.
Likely negative effects:
-An increase in No votes for poorly crafted proposals
Keep in mind those who are funded by the treasury will come out against this change, using FUD and other tactics to see it fail, to their benefit. They are quite happy with the status quo. It wouldn't surprise me if they submitted or popularized a competing, inferior proposal as Ryan and Rion did last time around, in order to distract or dilute from this one. Don't let them sway you from the simple, clear logic which this proposal presents. Also beware attacks from their faithful defenders.
Similarly, there are likely a few MNOs who enjoy their outsized influence on what passes and what doesn't because of a lack of greater MNO participation. Don't let one or two participating whales convince you by their no votes that there is some sort of unspoken consensus. Support this proposal and watch the MNOs come, and the community be reborn from it's slow death of apathy and stagnation.
This is a simple proposal, causing a simple yet effective shift in perspective, and is simple to code.
If approved, the change would be required to be included in the next minor release, ie 19.4.
See here for previous discussions on the same subject:
https://www.reddit.com/user/forro68/submitted/
Thank you for your support. I look forward to new life being breathed into the community and the project.
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Discussion: Should we fund this proposal?
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https://mnowatch.org/votethenumbers/votethenumbers3/calc3.php?proposals%5B%5D=LeftoverTreasuryFunds
Do these 254 yes voters that represent THE 69% OF THE VOTERS EXPECT THEIR DECISION TO BE IMPLEMENTED FOR 100% OF THE TIME?
This is absurd!! THE DASH COMMUNITY MUST NOT BOW TO THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY!!!!
As long as we have reached the minimum participation of 10% here, I suggest we divide the time to 254+47+65=366 pieces. And for the first 254 pieces this proposal should not be implemented, and for the rest 47 pieces the proposal will be implemented (provided forro will bring us the code).
Lets define a time window of 5 years, this means that for the rest 4 years and 3 months the status quo remains, but for the last 9 months forro's idea will be tried.
Lets define a time window of 5 years, this means that for the rest 4 years and 3 months the status quo remains, but for the last 9 months forro's idea will be tried, provided of course that the yes voters remain 47 after 4 years and 3 months, otherwise it will be tried for as long as the yes voters will be that date.
Do these 254 NO voters that represent THE 69% OF THE VOTERS EXPECT THEIR DECISION TO BE IMPLEMENTED FOR 100% OF THE TIME?
I don't get the benefit to be honest.
Additionally, as mentioned in the OP, and has been discussed repeatedly in previous discussions on the subject, MNOs are not so dumb and shortsighted as to vote no on everything. They are major stakeholders in the project, and want to see it succeed. They will fund good proposals. This fear is unfounded. Those who continue to propagate it have not stopped to really think about it.
However no i don't think all MN owners are as techy as you might believe.
I would have changed the proposal to
1) Tie the MN payout to vote, meaning no vote no payout or
2) If the vote you are casting wins you get the extra reward (don't matter if its yes or no). This way you have to think even more before casting the vote. And if MN don't vote at all their reward will be halved. Maybe the half goes to a treasury for incubators or something....
Specially (2) is what i prefer.
I will support this for now. Maybe we could tweak this afterwards....
The status quo has failed. Apathy has taken over the community. If we do not support and embrace this safe, simple, yet effective change, dash will continue it's slide into oblivion. Vote yes on this proposal and watch as things turn around!
Sorry, but you are deluding yourself about your perceived ingenuity of this proposal.
The project is falling out of the TOP100 rankings because TOTAL FAILURE in marketing.
Cluelessness in marketing has taken over DCG, since ever.
Not so long ago, we have had plenty of funds in our treasury pot, like millions of dollars at our disposal.
But if we are honest, we don´t really deserve any better, than having to suffer this lesson in humility.
Many other projects which don´t even have a monthly budget, have surpassed us and are ranking much higher.
Most of them are technical garbage btw, yet they have a much bigger, louder, healthier and growing community.
Such 110% failure in marketing is just unacceptable.
We should no longer tolerate the cheeky silence of DCG in this regard.
Its just beyond offensive to every single MNO.
If we had greater MNO participation, they would have added to the discussion, brought new ideas for marketing, and done more to keep those marketing proposals accountable.
The problem we have is that we have continuously funded lousy proposals and will continue to do so until more MNOs come to the table to say, enough, we need to do better.
Without them, nothing will change.
You should not form a governance question asking for something new to happen.
If you want a change to occur, initially you should form a governance question ASKING THE MASTERNODES TO CONFIRM THE STATUS QUO.
That way you expose the Dash status quo, which has NEVER been voted.
The Dash status quo has been decided by agents having in their mind that their red lines should never been passed.
Yet another stupid governance question, stupidity is bigger than the universe.
1) You put a governance question asking the voters to confirm the status quo.
2) If the status quo is not confirmed, obviously a change is needed, so you code the change.
3) After coding the change, you put to vote the governance proposal with the changes.
When I say "put a governance question asking the voters to confirm the status quo" I obviously mean that this question should last long (at least 24 months, if not permanent).
So that the supporters of the status quo do not have the excuse that they did not have time to vote. They should not being able to claim that the status quo issue did not reach the required minimum participation due to a limited voting period.
We need more engagement from the MNO, and if this tiny bit of extra rewards gets them to actually come out and use the voting system, there's a chance they'll become more engaged and start funding proposals they actually want. We need a way to get these non-voting MNO (the majority, unfortunately) to come out of the woodwork and participate. If this gets them looking/thinking, it could be good to consider.
Without it, we will continue to get the same lousy results we have been getting.
Support this safe, important change, and watch how things improve. Do not fear it.
The entirety of the monthly treasury funds would equal to about ~ 1 Dash per Masternode per month,
but assuming the leftover is only a fraction of the treasury funds, it would equal to much less than that.
What i don´t like about distributing leftover funds to MNOs, is that it will set all the wrong incentives.
Granting leftover treasury funds is potentially dangerous, because it will financially incentivize MNOs to vote NO on ALL proposals, not only bad proposals but on good proposals alike.
MNOs would be badly seduced and tempted to always vote NO, if such an incentive is ever going to be enacted.
Future POs would not only have to persuade and convince MNOs of how their proposal will benefit Dash,
but would have to struggle even more so, by having to defeat the MNOs innate desire and longing for greed and personal gain, which of course is a very human attribute.
Right now, whenever MNOs grant a PO funding for his proposal, we are aware that every Dash holder (including non-MNOs) are paying for it by 'inflation tax'. This is already tough enough a burden for POs when having to persuade and convince the MNO.
But this proposal, if it passes, will basically make the MNOs >themselves< pay for each future proposal which they approve, and therefore would make it even more harder - if not impossible - for a PO to obtain funding, no matter how good and promising their proposal is.
We should not create an incentive for all the MNO to vote NO on ALL proposals, irrespective of an individual proposal´s merit and scope.
This proposal may have been created with the best of intentions, even though it has the potential to literally kill off our DAO.
Take time to consider and vote responsably guys!
Some feel this step is too extreme, others feel this step is not enough.
The main point of this proposal is to shift the perspective of the treasury funds from 'free money', freely tossed into the wind, to 'coming out of my pocket', creating a sense of ownership. This shift in perspective is extremely important before taking further, more drastic steps. Obviously this will not solve all of Dash's problems, but the shift in persepective is an extremely important missing piece of the incentive structure.
Is it not better that we are taking a small, careful step forward, versus maintaining the failed status quo, or taking far more drastic, unpredicatable changes?
The treasury is already working just the way it is supposed to.
If you are refering to the poor price performance of Dash, that is nothing this proposal or any other slight change here or there can easily fix.
Its a lack of effective marketing that Dash is suffering from.
If Dash is failing, then it is because lack of steering mass attention,
and failure of attracting the investment of BIG MONEY into Dash.
This can only be fixed by steering millions upon millions of people towards Dash, which is tough - but not impossible - to accomplish, provided sufficient funding of course.
It should have been done ages ago.
Too much money was squandered for pure waste and nonsense like taxes for example.
Many POs already struggle with the difficulty to persuade and convince the MNO.
Your proposal will only make it even more difficult for POs to get their proposal approved,
when its already a tough undertaking right now.
You are arguing as if we are suffering from a severe crisis of countless approvals of the wrong and bad proposals,
and that it is somehow the reason for the downfall of Dash.
Such outlandish claims really make the chicken laugh.
First you say it's barely anything, at most 1Dash per month extra, and more likely only a fraction of a Dash, so the MNO won't even notice it.
Then you say the MNO are greedy and they will vote NO on everything to get all the extra money.
Your first statement is mostly correct: the MNO do not really need that extra 1Dash per month--but the PO really need it. So if this proposal hits a nerve and gets the PO to think twice about proposal quality or delivery performance, just by the off chance the MNO could possibly not fund them, then it will have succeeded. Nothing changes with this except slightly increased incentive for: a) PO to do a better job, and b) for MNO to examine proposals more closely.
In my opinion, this change isn't really for the MNO at all. It is for the PO to have more responsibilty, by having them paid with other people's money instead of "free money."
>> no matter how good and promising their proposal is.
In Dash, who is the judge of what is "good and promising?"
Answer: the MNO. That's literally what this voting system is for.
The MNO decide, they are the ones signing the paychecks, so the money should come out of their own pockets. It's that simple.
The MNO have always had the option NOT to fund any proposal. There's no difference in that regard. Like you said, it is at maximum only 1-Dash extra per month for the MNO, so--rather than being super greedy selfish capitalist demons--they'd rather put it toward things that might grow their investment.
In fact, we have many MNO around who are actively asking how they can donate MORE to help out. You're sorely mistaken if you think MNO will immediately be attracted to this extra fraction of a dash/month more of income at the expense of potential gain on their investment value the Proposals might generate. History has shown that MNO consider it money well spent --- eight years of the DAO have proven the MNO enjoy throwing money at anything that might possibly do so.
My main concern is not even the greed/enrichment factor alone, but its automatic coupling with laziness.
You know, the DAO is suffering from historic low voting participation of the MNO.
Ask yourself, if paying the MNOs more for doing less (not participating) will really result in higher engagement.
To the contrary, this proposal is incentivizing the passivity and laziness of MNOs, and pays them a bonus for it, so to speak, it could very well cause a further drop in voting participation, something we can´t afford to let happen.
The right direction would be, to increase the earnings of voting MNO by 10%,
and to reduce the earnings of non-voting MNO by 10%.
(assuming a ~ 50:50 balance if such a logic would be enacted)
Right now we have a voting participation of a paltry 10-15% of the MNO.
But i am not sure, how to technically work this out in detail.
Another approach could be, not to penalize the non-voting MNO, but to pay a voting MNO 0.1 Dash per Masternode(1K) per cycle (out of the treasury), if he/she has voted on at least 70-80% of all the active proposals.
A couple thoughts:
You noted, "...those who are funded by the treasury will come out against this change..." but I don't think that's necessarily true. If a current proposal owner believes they are creating value for the network, and they are effective in keeping community members informed, then they should have nothing to fear. Indeed, they should prefer a streamlined, effective, treasury.
To echo Gonzo, I'm not sure though, whether the very slight difference of Dash received or not by each MNO will be enough incentive to spur MNOs who historically haven't participated in the voting process to do so. But if your proposal were taken to its extreme -- directing block rewards currently going to the Treasury to MNOs, then it's very likely that shoddy proposals would not be as able to pass, and that proposal owners who are not timely and open about their deliverables would cease to be funded.
In a parallel universe, trustless masternode shares would be a thing, so that it wouldn't be only those who have staked a lot, but those who have staked anything, who would realize the dispersement.
The main point of this proposal is to shift the perspective of the treasury funds from 'free money', freely tossed into the wind, to 'coming out of my pocket', creating a sense of ownership. This shift in perspective is extremely important before taking further, more drastic steps. Obviously this will not solve all of Dash's problems, but the shift in persepective is an extremely important missing piece of the incentive structure.
Is it not better that we are taking a small, careful step forward, versus maintaining the failed status quo, or taking far more drastic, unpredicatable changes?
If there is no code ready yet, how much do you think this code will cost, and who is going to pay the cost of that code?
Lets say for example the leftover treasury funds / unallocated funds amounts to 10% of the treasury funds. Current treasury is 4,264 dash, so if 10% of that remains unallocated (leftover) --> 426.4 dash. Divided by all MNO's = 426.4 dash / 3,404 = 0.13 dash per MNO.
How does this in any way motivate a MNO to participate in the Dash voting process or motivate them to engage in budget proposals on Dash Central ? Specially if they get that 0.13 dash anyways ?
I just don't see how we are changing MNO's voting behavior here. Particularly the voting behavior of those MNO's that are currently not active in the Dash governance system.
I can see this decision proposal have more effect, if there is a condition tied to it : that only MNO's that actually participate in Dash voting process / have a voting history, can get that treasury leftover funding. But that is not what is being proposed here.
So i have to vote no, as i don't see this change voting participation among those silent MNO's.
I would be more interested in finding out why those MNO's are currently passive / not voting.
Is it due to apathy ? A lack of interest ? Language barrier ? Or is it perhaps due to a fear of getting their voting behavior analyzed and their privacy diminished ? (mnowatch.org for example)
If it is the last then there is not much that can be done to increase voting participation, untill that issue gets resolved (if it is indeed an issue).
The main point of this proposal is to shift the perspective of the treasury funds from 'free money', freely tossed into the wind, to 'coming out of my pocket', creating a sense of ownership. This shift in perspective is extremely important before taking further, more drastic steps. Obviously this will not solve all of Dash's problems, but the shift in persepective is an extremely important missing piece of the incentive structure.
Is it not better that we are taking a small, careful step forward, versus maintaining the failed status quo, or taking far more drastic, unpredicatable changes?
That is because Dash has no data on how much of its blockrewards are hodl or spend, specified into miners, masternode owners and treasury.
Masternode owners maybe long-term investors, but they too are getting hit by this crypto winter, specially if they have limited reserves and living off crypto.
With low reserves masternode owners could be forced to sell their masternode rewards, in order to extend their fiat reserves and outlast this crypto winter.
I also think the time where small masternode owners (4 or 5 masternodes) can setup a new masternode purely from their masternode rewards is over. With current low masternode rewards it will just take too long these days.
https://dash-news.de/dashtv/#curr=USD&value=5000
5 masternodes = 32 dash per month.
1000 dash / 32 = 31 months.
You're right we don't have all the data (thankfully), but we have very good assumptions. We know miners and POs have fiat bills to pay, and the MNOs have dilution of their investment to overcome. MNO are much more likely to hold onto their rewards, just by those facts alone.
It's interesting that despite that you've been willing to fund nearly anything and everything for years and years now, that you would oppose this solid step in the right direction, as simple and small as it may be.
This proposal is very likely to bring new MNOs to the table, and likely new ideas and enthusiasm with them. Their participation may help us bring about the next steps to take in Dash governance, and may help you fine tune your idea to the point the community is ready to support it.
Opposing my proposal means keeping the status quo, and the quiet slide into oblivion will continue. Are you happy with that?
At some point the crypto market will shake off this bear market and Dash price performance will improve because of that. The quiet slide into oblivion as you mentioned can be can be addressed in better ways (more Dash marketing, more Dash PR, Dash outreach programs, Dash website refresh, more Dash connections to DeFi). Those things need to be discussed as soon as Dash Platform hits Mainnet and hopefully more funding gets available to address above mentioned Dash issues.
Evo will not save us.
The missing piece of the incentive structure must be put into place, and this proposal does that.