Welcome!

So... This is very interesting timing and is a very important factor in this decision proposal. Our lawyer just reached out to me to discuss a new US law called the "Corporate Transparency Act". This requires corporations to disclose ownership information to FINCEN. This goes into effect in Jan 2024 but since we are already an established corporation, we do not need to do this reporting until Jan 2025. However, it does highlight a hard deadline when we need to "fix" our trust situation. I would like to re-emphasize that, although I think it is a very good long term solution, the DIF ownership can be a short term solution and if there is sufficient resources (DTP volunteers) available to re-launch a trust with DTP oversight, that can be done by the community at any time. I encourage as many MNs as possible to vote on this; it is an important decision and I would like to get as much support as possible. Thanks in advance.

In light of this info, if this proposal passes, I would like to see any existing DCG shares pass out of the hands of the DIF prior to Jan '24.

The DIF is young and promising. No need to make their lives more difficult by inviting Fincen to start breathing down their necks.

Excuse me. I meant prior to Jan '25.

@amanda_b_johnson This reporting has to be done by all US based corporations that the DIF owns; it isn't specific to DCG.

Or... One way to "fix" the "trust situation" would be for DCG Inc. could become DCG. No need then to interact with FinCEN employees, or pay annual tribute to the DC regime, etc.

Re: DTPs -- has anyone made the case that they have ever been able to provide oversight? It seems structurally, that has not and cannot happen. Perhaps having the DTPs there for "oversight" made MNOs complacent -- allowing for many-year delays. I think we can and should do better. Why not simplify?

DIF ownership is the least complicated, least expensive option it will have the least disruption to DCG operations and development, and it still has an element of oversight of DCG. Anyone who thinks that breaking up DCG to deal with this situation is the right approach, especially at this crucial time of development, does not have a good enough understanding of the efforts and impacts involved. It has been made clear in other discussions that our infrastructure requirements would be greatly impacted and there are key developers that do not want to or can't accept Dash as their compensation. If there is anyone in the community who feels they can create a new team to support the same development activities as DCG without a corporate structure, they should do this; if that team is proven to be successful then there could be reason to reconsider the existence of DCG. IMO, without a SOLID plan in place to do this, it doesn't make sense to vote no on this proposal.

Just to clarify, I shouldn't have said "without a corporate structure", although I feel this is the best vehicle to manage such a team, I recognize that there are other jurisdictions and types of entities that could work; but IMO, they all have challenges and limitations.

Again, I would like to reiterate that there is no ill-intent here; DCG just needs closure on this topic so that we can move forward with making DCG a company with legitimate ownership. I cannot speak to why previous decision proposals were done differently/inconstantly and I sincerely hope that a majority is achieved on this proposal, but not at the detriment of kicking this can down the road any further. I highly encourage as many MN's to vote as possible so that there is no further question about DCG's motives.

If this decision proposal fails to get super majority / fails to pass the 10% treshold, i would consider this decision proposal as not passing and i think DCG next step should be to launch a new decision proposal on the only realistic remaining option left for MNO's to vote upon : Create a new trust with a single trustee that includes DTP oversight as the original (also known as option 2).

On hindsight DCG could have reached closure sooner by introducing several decision proposals at the same time, including each of the available options. Instead DCG tried to force its preferred option onto MNO's and that backfired.

DCG then tried to enforce a simple vote majority rule condition upon MNO's and that backfired even more (as it opens Pandorra's box)

This isn't a viable/realistic option unless there are willing and qualified people to serve as DTPs.

Which we will only know once new DTP elections have been organised, which can only be done after MNO's had a chance to vote on option 2.

I think your argument ''unless there are willing and qualified people to serve as DTPs'' only serves to avoid having to deal with option 2 and avoid having a form of oversight back on DCG and its Board.

Option 2 is specifically mentioned in your previous decision proposal as a viable option under the subject 'What are our options'.

Quoting :

What are our options?
OPTION 1: Create a new trust with a single trustee. This would take time to evaluate new trustees and would likely cost anywhere between $4k - $12k to establish the trust and about $3k - $15k per year for trustee services. This would also require DCG to pause pursuit of any new partnerships with larger institutions and would increase the risk of legal ramifications for not having a valid corporation until the new trust has been established. However, even given these downsides, this would be a simple trust with no DTP component so that it is less complicated and less costly than the original structure. This option does not rule out the ability to re-institute DTP’s at a later date when the market improves and if the community wants to do so (if there is sufficient commitment from people who want to serve as Trust Protectors).

OPTION 2: Create a new trust with a single trustee that includes DTP oversight as the original. The costs for this would almost certainly be more than option 1 (probably double) and it doesn’t solve the issues surrounding recruiting competent Trust Protectors. This would also probably take longer to establish given the complexity and uniqueness of the structure; finding a willing trustee may prove difficult.

OPTION 3: DCG Board members hold the shares of DCG instead of a trust. This would require legal costs if/when the board changes to transfer the shares to/from new and departing board members but it is likely to be the least costly and most expedient option to make DCG a corporation in good standing. However, the DCG board does not feel comfortable having ownership in DCG even in a temporary time frame due to potential legal and tax consequences.

While other options have been discussed amongst the community, the DCG board and previously seated DTPs, they were either too disruptive to the operations of DCG, required development resources/money or were too complicated, requiring excessive administration.

https://www.dashcentral.org/p/Dash-DAO-irrevocable-trust-next-steps

Now suddenly option 2 is no longer viable ?

I think there will be a big difference between last DTP election turnout and a new DTP election turnout (if option 2 is preferred by MNO's), because we all now have a much more clear picture about how valuable the position of a Dash Trust Protector really is :

* DTP's can replace the Trustee (unclear to many before)
* DTP's provide oversight on DCG Board, when instructed by MNO's through a decision proposal that passes the super majority (yes, even the Dash Trust Protectors operate with the 10% treshold).
* DTP's can start extensive investigations if there is sufficient cause for it and it is requested by a MNO or a group of MNO's.

By the way : what do you mean with 'issues surrounding recruiting competent Trust Protectors' ?

Dash Trust Protectors just need to qualify to a set of pre-defined conditions : reveal some personal information, show they have no criminal record etc), the word 'competent' seems woefully out of place.

When I say "qualified", I mean people who have enough time and willingness to do what is required to keep a valid trust. But that isn't even the biggest problem; if there are no volunteers to serve, why go through all of the cost and efforts to setup such a trust again. If someone wants DTP oversight again, they need to take actions to support it (recruit qualified volunteers, run elections and submit a proposal to have a new trust take ownership of DCG). This can all happen at any time but putting up a decision proposal for such a structure without the resources/people to support it is just irresponsible.

As for DCG not wanting oversight; that is not true at all. In fact, one of the conditions in this proposal is that the network can submit a proposal at any time if they want the DIF to take action against DCG for something.

Unfortunetely this proposal seems very much a short term solution, to be discarded by DCG as soon as Dash price reach a certain price for a certain time period. I rather have a long term solution for this that does not need to be revisited / changed / discarded later on.

The DIF supervisors wanted a condition to re-evaluate their ownership of DCG at after certain price milestones. This does not mean that they will submit a proposal to transfer their shares to another entity but it is a possibility. IMO, this is the best long term solution but even if it is short term, it allows us to move forward and start untangling us from the invalid trust.

If there is no ill-intent here, edit your proposal and withdraw the terms you set in order for this proposal to be accepted.

Remove this phrase:"his decision proposal will be considered passing / approved by a simple majority (more yes votes than no votes)."

If you dont do that , then THERE IS ILL-INTENT HERE.

Another f'ing joke. When demo posted his somewhat convoluted solution to voting granularity, MNOs rejected it, but when DCG - once again - declare new voting rules i.e. no super-majority needed - suddenly it's okay. If it's okay for DCG to win proposals in such manner then we should go back and compensate all other proposals that had more yes votes than no votes without reaching super-majority. Honestly, ya'll a bunch of hypocrites for letting this happen, repeatedly.

And what's all these stupid BS conditions. Does anyone at DCG actually know what "ownership" means? It is clear DCG are not serous about handing over ownership. I mean, they want it all back if dash surpasses 100 USD... and the DIF will just say, "okay then". lol.

It's BS proposals like this that keep me from putting more money into dash.

To be clear; the conditions were from the DIF Supervisors, not DCG. Regarding the comment about going back and compensating all previous proposals that received a simple majority; that is not an accurate comparison because this is not a funding proposal.

You guys aren´t allowed to implement a proposal based on more yes votes than no votes without having reached supermajority.
This is not just illegal, but highly immoral as well.

''because this is not a funding proposal''

Neither were these decision propsals :

https://www.dashcentral.org/p/revert-coinjoin-to-privatesend :

431 Yes
262 No
11 Abstain

Since DCG does not value the 10% treshold, i guess DCG will now be required to revert CoinJoin to PrivateSend, as there is a simple vote majority here.

https://www.dashninja.pl/proposaldetails.html?proposalhash=0726dcda67fd99fc6e90e8d01cfc01f2abab1423c3df1002c5a8ccf95ba72f0f

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/pre-proposal-project-updates-via-proposal-system.53469/

268 Yes
126 No
59 Abstain

Since DCG does not value the 10% treshold, i guess DCG will now be required to provide project updates per cycle, via the proposal system.

Yes, exactly, thank you.

There are of course far more of these decision proposals that did not meet the treshold, had more yes votes then no votes and were not funding proposals.

This one for example : https://www.dashcentral.org/p/DashAdvisoryBoard

Maybe someone should inform proposal owner that on second view this decision proposal did pass (through simple vote majority), and we will start on this Dash Advisory Board right away.

Because DCG determined that the 10% treshold can be discarded, whenever a proposal owner feels like it.

I understand the concern raised about the 10% threshold, but this seems like a good solution to organizational issue facing DCG.

This gets a "YES" vote from me. I hope to see solid support from other MNOs so that we can completely bypass the threshold issues some are concerned with.

Is your YES an unconditional YES?

I mean, what if this proposal gets just one YES more than the NOs, and DCG decides to implement the decision based on the "more yes votes than no votes" rule.

Will you in that case keep saying YES;;;;

Do you obey the Dash law or do you believe that the end (your own personal end specifically) justifies the means?

I decided not to vote on this decision proposal due to the included simple majority condition (more yes votes than no votes), which ignores the 10% treshold.

For budget proposals the 10% treshold is important as it gives approval to funding requests

For decision proposals the 10% treshold is important as it measure voting participation and measure interest from MNO's in the topic of the decision proposal in question. Decision proposals not reaching the 10% treshold could mean MNO's have little interest in the topic of a specific decision proposal or it could mean that MNO's don't feel informed enough on the topic, to make a voting decision on it.

Not reaching the 10% treshold with decision proposals, causing such decision proposals to disappear from Dash Central and yet have DCG still use the yes votes to declare a winner of a not passing decision proposal is just plain wrong in my view.

>Not reaching the 10% treshold with decision proposals, causing such decision proposals to disappear from Dash Central
> and yet have DCG still use the yes votes to declare a winner of a not passing decision proposal is just plain wrong in my view.

Exactly!

The previous proposal (DASH-DAO-IRREVOCABLE-TRUST-NEXT-STEPS) got 271 Yes - 94 No = 177 net votes. What if the current proposal (DCG-DECISION-PROPOSAL--DIF-OWNERSHIP) gets less than 177 net votes?

In that case will DCG still insist of rejecting the previous (DASH-DAO-IRREVOCABLE-TRUST-NEXT-STEPS) and implement the current one (DCG-DECISION-PROPOSAL--DIF-OWNERSHIP) ?

Dear masternodes, do you feel safe of having such an irrational DCG to govern you? Of course you do, as all the cattles meant to be slaughtered feel safe with their shepherd.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEH5jReEkSk
Will the masternodes ever be able to escape the animal level they are currently on, become humans and vote the numbers?

"Here is wisdom, and whoever has a mind in him, let him vote the number of the beast, for it is the number of a human."

As example you can look at this decision proposal : https://www.dashcentral.org/p/Dash-DAO-irrevocable-trust-next-steps

If DCG had used the simple majority condition here, then that specific decision proposal would have passed (as it had more yes votes then no votes), while not passing the 10% treshold.

This irregular simple majority condition usage by DCG over time (mostly used after a previously failed DCG decision proposal) has muddy the waters, with regards to Dash Governance. And i want to stay clear of it.

There is no suspicious or malicious intent here; we just need to have closure on this topic until/unless one or more individuals are willing to step up with a different proposal to reinstate the trust protector system or a simple trust. There are legal implications to "doing nothing" that the board doesn't feel comfortable with and this seems like a great solution for the long or short term.

1) Why dont you add a "Do Nothing" proposal , for it to compete with yours.

2) What kind of legal implications are you talking about? On which State? Yours? I dont care!

Thank you for following thru on my suggestion, this is an easy YES, solves a lot of problems. Dash can worrry about forming another "trust" when it is multibillion dollar market cap.

This is the official DIF account on this site that you may recognize from our own funding proposals.

We'd like to confirm that we discussed this proposal with Brian and offer to assume legal ownership of DCG if this proposal with the stated conditions is accepted by the network.

> if this proposal with the stated conditions is accepted

The stated conditions of this proposal are illegal !!!
DCG wants to bypass the "10%_net_votes" law of Dash!
Their action is pure scam.

They should first challenge the "10%_net_votes" status quo, then propose another election method, and if their new method is accepted then ask for this proposal to be judged by this new method.

https://www.dash.org/forum/index.php?threads/pre-proposal-put-the-unvoted-10-net-votes-threshold-of-the-dash-budget-system-into-vote.54042/

''This decision proposal will be considered passing / approved by a simple majority (more yes votes than no votes).''

When in doubt of winning a decision proposal, just leave the 10% treshold out of it and just pray the yes votes outclass the no votes with at least +1.

Got it.

Previous decision proposal from DCG with regards to the Dash Trust did not have such specific condition. That decision proposal failed to pass the 10% treshold with rather low voting participation for a DCG decision proposal (439 votes, of which **74** voted to abstain).

Link : https://www.dashcentral.org/p/Dash-DAO-irrevocable-trust-next-steps

Anyone voting 'abstain' in this decision proposal will basically be wasting their vote, as only yes and no votes are taking into consideration this time. Please be aware of that during voting.

Taking any decision not based on the "10%_net_votes" Dash law , is obviously a DCG coup.

On the other hand the "10%_net_votes" status quo has never been voted.

So the first thing to do is to put the "10%_net_votes" status quo into a vote. If the "10%_net_votes" status quo passes the 10% net votes threshold, then it could be considered a legitimate and valid status quo.

Pure logic, but the masternodes and the DCG are irrational beasts.

"Here is wisdom, and whoever has a mind in him, let him vote the number of the beast, for it is the number of a human."

Not doing anything isn't an option. We need a solution. If you propose a different one as a proposal and it gets more votes we will go with that.

Do nothing IS AN OPTION.

If you want to be fair, you should add a "Do nothing" proposal, and observe whether it will get more "yes" votes than this proposal.

The previous proposal (DASH-DAO-IRREVOCABLE-TRUST-NEXT-STEPS) got 271 Yes - 94 No = 177 net votes. What if the current proposal (DCG-DECISION-PROPOSAL--DIF-OWNERSHIP) gets less than 177 net votes? Will you then still insist of rejecting the previous (DASH-DAO-IRREVOCABLE-TRUST-NEXT-STEPS) and implement the current (DCG-DECISION-PROPOSAL--DIF-OWNERSHIP) ?

Is the above rational?

@Brianfoster, @Quantumexplorer: it is completely wrong the way you understand which of the election methods it is rational to applied.

In short,

@Brianfoster, @Quantumexplorer: COULD YOU PLEASE STOP ACTING STUPIDLY, COULD YOU PLEASE STOP PLAYING WITH THE ELECTION METHODS AND CHOSE THE ONE WHICH FULLFIL YOUR PRIVATE GOALS, AND CAST A POLL HERE IN THE BUDGET WHERE ALL THE POSSIBLE OPTIONS (REGARDING THIS ISSUE) WILL BE NUMBERED AND BE AVAILABLE FOR VOTING ?

https://mnowatch.org/votethenumbers

Here is an a example. Suppose you want to select among six options. A range from 0 to 5.

Suppose you affort 4 proposals granularity, lets choose for the sake of the example :
Digit1: dash-marketing-hub-affiliate-bounty
Digit2: encointerUBI-Digit1
Digit3: encointerUBI-Digit2
Digit4: encointerUBI-Range-0-242-Digit3

Here is the URL everyone can vote:

https://mnowatch.org/votethenumbers/prepnumvote3/prep3.php?minnum=0&maxnum=5&proposals%5B%5D=dash-marketing-hub-affiliate-bounty&proposals%5B%5D=encointerUBI-Digit1&proposals%5B%5D=encointerUBI-Digit2&proposals%5B%5D=encointerUBI-Range-0-242-Digit3

And here is the way someone can select the option 2:

https://mnowatch.org/votethenumbers/prepnumvote3/prepfinalvote.php?thevote=2&themax=5&themin=0&theprops=30cac78c2c3dab4e0c1451a71f3b66455c4af6b1301988f1f8a0e2286a8b8010+35d8693d6e31be5cf42ed98dad4f926c741cf1bf38b6df7f045d9a627c428fc8+d4930bbcb3bea2dc733b9b71a857a643a33af5106cd16d26f69298ac258a2cec+6724fa9d9c77e776adb8260b42e92d9db61aa2e5ea28c1554377d6454db51d0b%0D%0A

Will the masternodes ever be able to escape the animal level they are currently on, become humans and vote the numbers?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEH5jReEkSk

I am just getting a bit tired about DCG dancing so easily around 10% treshold, whenever one of their decision proposals does not pass / gets rejected. I think it would be good for the Dash Governance system in the future, to have a clear differentiation between budget proposals and decision proposals and have a strict set of rules for each of them.

By not taking into account the 10% treshold DCG set the door open to possibly appointing a winner (more yes then no votes) to a decision proposal that could very well disappear from Dash Central completely, because it could not reach the 10% treshold.

Currently i have not made up my mind between :

* Creating a new trust with a single trustee, that includes DTP oversight as the original
* Bringing the DCG shares under ownership of the DIF, with DIF required to take action if masternodes show support (support in the form of vote majority or support in the form of passing the 10% treshold ?) in a decision proposal that calls for a certain action.

I will wait and read other comments, before making a decision.

>I am just getting a bit tired about DCG dancing so easily around 10% treshold, whenever one of their decision proposals does not pass / gets rejected.
>I think it would be good for the Dash Governance system in the future, to have a clear differentiation between budget proposals and decision proposals and have a strict set of rules for each of them.

Steps for a decent governance proposal that may lead to a change.

1) You put a governance question asking the voters to confirm the status quo.
2) If the status quo is not confirmed, obviously a change is needed, so you search someone to fund and/or to code the change.
3) After coding the change, you put into vote your governance proposal along with the required code.

https://www.dash.org/forum/index.php?threads/miner-reallocation2-dao-refill.53874/page-3#post-235815

By the way, can you pls update below site to v20.0.2 : https://www.dash.org/downloads/#windows (still pointing to v20.0.0)

It is now updated. It was in the pipeline, just needed the person responsible for the website to wake up.